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POLE POSITION: NATIONAL CABLE &
TELECOMMUNICATIONS ASS’N V. GULF POWER CO. AND
THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE FCC’S POLE ATTACHMENTS
ACT REACHING HIGHER GROUNDg
“What’s in a name? That which we call a rose by any other name
would smell as sweet.”∗

I. INTRODUCTION
The Pole Attachments Act authorizes the Federal Communications
Commission (FCC) to regulate the rates, terms, and conditions of
attachments to poles owned by utility companies.1 The scope of this
Act, specifically what type of pole attachments are covered, has been the
subject of recent debate in the telecommunications and information
technology industries.2 The Act originally applied only to pole
attachments by cable television companies offering cable television

g

The term Pole Position was inspired by the 1982 Atari video arcade racing game “Pole
Position.” This note addresses the recent decision from the United States Supreme Court, regarding
the FCC’s Pole Attachments Act. Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n, Inc. v. Gulf Power Co., 534
U.S. 327 (2002); 47 U.S.C. § 224 (2000).
∗

William Shakespeare, Romeo and Juliet, act 2, sc. 2 (Dover Thrift ed., Dover Publ’n,
1993).
1. 47 U.S.C. § 224(b) (2000). In 1978, Congress adopted the Pole Attachments Act as part
of the 1934 Communications Act. Communications Act Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-234,
§ 6, 92 Stat. 33, 35 (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 224 (2000)). The term “pole attachment” refers to any
attachment by a cable television system to a pole, duct, conduit, or right-of-way owned or controlled
by a power utility or telephone company. 47 U.S.C. § 224(a)(4) (2000). The term “regulation”
means a rule or order, having legal force, issued by an administrative agency or a local government.
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1289 (Bryan A. Garner ed., 7th ed., West 1999).
2. Compare Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n, Overview: The Cable Industry and Pole
Attachment Regulation (September 2001) at http://www.ncta.com (last visited Feb. 6, 2003)
[hereinafter Overview] (explaining that the FCC’s regulatory protections should govern all
information service provider pole attachments, regardless of the type), with Press Release, United
Telecom Council, UTC Files in Supreme Court Telecom Battle (June 14, 2001)
at
http://www.utc.org (last visited Feb. 6, 2003) (Press Release Archive) (arguing that Congress
intended to provide the FCC with only limited jurisdiction over utility infrastructure, namely wirebased communications providers and cable service providers that offer solely traditional cable
television).

87

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2004

1

Akron Law Review, Vol. 37 [2004], Iss. 1, Art. 3
DELTORTO2.DOC

88

2/16/2004 11:02 AM

AKRON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 37:87

services.3 A 1996 Amendment4 to the Act expanded the FCC’s
jurisdiction to include coverage of attachments by wire-based
telecommunications services.5 Additionally, in 1998, the FCC issued a
rule6 that interpreted the Act to cover rate regulations of attachments
providing commingled high-speed Internet access and traditional cable
television (commingled services)7 and rate regulations of attachments by
3. 47 U.S.C. § 224(d)(3) (2000). Section 224(d)(3) states “[t]his subsection shall apply to
the rate for any pole attachment used by a cable television system solely to provide cable service.”
It is this subsection, and specifically Congress’ use of the word “any,” that has sparked much of the
debate over the FCC’s regulation of pole attachments for high-speed Internet access via cable
modems. See Steve Kelley, Liberating Our Digital Future: How the 1996 Telecommunications Act
Definitions are Hobbling Change, 27 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 2137, 2156 (2001) (stating that in the
Gulf Power decision at the lower court, the Eleventh Circuit expressly concluded that Congress’
definition was “not significant enough to sweep Internet services into the cable service ambit”). See
also infra notes 65, 66 and accompanying text for a discussion on the interpretation of the word
“any.”
4. Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.). The relevant section of that Act is Title VII, § 703. Id.
5. 47 U.S.C. § 224(e)(1) (2000). Section 224(e)(1) states “the Commission shall, no later
than 2 years after February 8, 1996, prescribe regulations in accordance with this subsection to
govern the charges for pole attachments used by telecommunications carriers to provide
telecommunications services.” Id.
6. See Nat’l Petroleum Refiners Ass’n v. FTC, 482 F.2d 672 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (establishing
the power of an agency to promulgate legislative rules when Congress constitutionally delegated
that power to the agency). See also American Hospital Ass’n v. NLRB, 499 U.S. 606 (1991)
(holding that the general grant of rulemaking power to the NLRB was not limited by the
requirement that the agency make certain determinations in each case). Section 551(4) of the
Federal Administrative Procedure Act (APA), Pub. L. 79-404, 60 Stat. 237 (1946) (current version
at 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-59, 801-08 (2000)), defines a rule as:
the whole or a part of an agency statement of general or particular applicability and
future effect designed to implement, interpret, or prescribe law or policy or describing
the organization, procedure, or practice requirements of an agency and includes the
approval or prescription for the future of rates, wages, corporate or financial structures or
reorganization thereof, prices, facilities, appliances, services or allowances therefor or of
valuations, costs, or accounting, or practices bearing on any of the foregoing.
5 U.S.C. § 551(4) (2000). Agency regulations, often referred to as legislative rules, have virtually
the identical legal effect to that of a statute. RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., SIDNEY A. SHAPIRO & PAUL
R. VERKUIL, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCESS § 6.4.4 (3d ed. 1999). When adopting a rule or
regulation, an agency must follow the procedures set forth in either the APA § 553, or the agency’s
internal enabling act. Id. The APA, which sets the floor level requirements for agency rulemaking,
adopted the “notice and comment” approach to rulemaking. Id. at § 6.4.6a. Section 553(b) of the
APA states that “notice of the proposed rulemaking shall be published in the Federal Register” and
the notice shall include, inter alia, “either the terms or substance of the proposed rule or a
description of the subjects and issues involved.” 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(3) (2000). Section 553(c) of the
APA indicates that after the required notice, “the agency shall give interested persons an
opportunity to participate in the rulemaking through submission of written data, views, or arguments
with or without opportunity for oral presentation.” § 553(c).
7. In re Implementation of § 703(e) of the Telecomms. Act of 1996, 13 F.C.C.R. 6777, 1998
WL 46987, ¶¶ 30-32 (1998) (codified at 47 C.F.R. §§ 1.1401-1.1418 (1999)) [hereinafter
Implementation] (deciding that “cable operators are entitled to the benefits of § 224 when providing
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wireless telecommunications service providers.8
Pole-owning utility companies challenged this FCC rule, asserting
that commingled cable services and wireless telecommunications
services are not covered by either of the Act’s two specific rate
regulation formulas.9 The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
reversed the FCC’s orders, holding that the plain meaning rule of
statutory construction led to a narrow interpretation of both rate
formulas.10
The court reasoned that by negative implication,
commingled services and wireless telecommunications were precluded
from the Act’s coverage.11 The Supreme Court granted certiorari and
commingled Internet and traditional cable services”). See also In re Heritage Cablevision Assocs.
of Dallas, L.P. v. Texas Utils. Elec. Co., 6 F.C.C.R 7099, 1991 WL 695211 (Nov. 29, 1991)
(determining that a cable operator that provides both traditional cable services and nontraditional
cable services, such as Internet access, on a commingled basis over a single network justified only a
single, regulated pole attachment charge by a utility pole owner). The FCC also stated that when §
224 is read in conjunction with the Cable Act of 1984, the legislative history of both provisions
indicate that a cable system providing both video and non-video broadband services is not excluded
from the benefits of § 224. Id. The Internet is defined as “a vast system of interconnect networks
operating under common protocols, yet operating independently and without any centralized
authority.” Winston P. Lloyd, What’s the Frequency Uncle Sam?: Will the Government Hold Up
the Information Superhighway in the Name of Competition?, 30 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 233, 233
(1995) (explaining that the Internet is an information superhighway where people interact
electronically).
8. Implementation, supra note 7, at ¶ 36. The FCC stated that, although wireless carriers
have not historically affixed their equipment to utility poles, the 1996 Act gives them the right to do
so, and entitles them to rates consistent with the regulation scheme set forth in § 224. Id. Section
224 does not describe the specific type of telecommunications equipment a carrier may attach, and
to establish an exhaustive list would not be advisable or even possible. Id.
9. Gulf Power Co. v. FCC, 208 F.3d 1263, 1271 (11th Cir. 2000). Pole owning utility
companies petitioned for review of an FCC order regulating rent to be paid by cable and
telecommunication service providers for attaching equipment to the utility companies’ poles. Id. at
1266. The FCC argued that on the issue of commingled cable Internet service, the attachments were
covered either by § 224(d)(1) as a cable service, or in the alternative, that the rates were just and
reasonable under § 224 (b)(1). Id. at 1276-77. The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
agreed with the utility companies and held, inter alia, that (1) the FCC lacked authority to regulate
pole attachments used for wireless communications, and (2) the FCC could not regulate pole
attachments for Internet service provided by cable companies. Id. at 1274, rev’d, 534 U.S. 327
(2002). See also infra note 33 and accompanying text for an explanation of § 224(b)(1)’s just and
reasonable rates.
10. Gulf Power, 208 F.3d at 1274. The court reasoned that the language of § 224 plainly
covers attachments for wire communications, and this supports a narrow reading of the FCC’s
authority. Id. (emphasis added). See also 47 U.S.C. § 153(52) (2000) (defining “wire
communications” as “the transmission of writing, signs, signals, pictures, and sounds of all kinds by
aid of wire, cable, or other like connections between the points of origin and reception of such
transmission, including all instrumentalities, facilities, apparatus, and services (among other things,
the receipt, forwarding, and delivery of communications) incidental to such transmission”).
11. Gulf Power, 208 F.3d at 1276. The court concluded that Internet service is neither a cable
service nor a telecommunications service; therefore the FCC has no authority under the 1996
Telecommunications Act to regulate Internet service providers. Id. Judge Carnes’ dissent criticized
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reversed the circuit court, upholding the application of the FCC’s
original rate regulation orders.12
Both high-speed Internet access via commingled cables and
wireless communications are complex and cutting edge topics in today’s
world of ever changing information technology.13 This Note examines
how these issues were addressed recently in Nat’l Cable & Telecomms.
Ass’n, Inc. v. Gulf Power Co. (Gulf Power).14 Part II of this Note
provides a review of the Pole Attachments Act, focusing particularly on
using the purpose behind the Act to establish the minimum and
maximum limitations of its coverage.15 Part III discusses the factual and
procedural history of the Gulf Power case, first addressing the Court of
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit’s opinion,16 and then detailing the U.S.
Supreme Court’s reasoning.17 Part IV analyzes the antitrust implications
of the FCC’s competitive approach to regulating the telecommunications
and information service technology industries.18 Additionally, Part IV
analyzes the Supreme Court’s decision to uphold FCC regulation of pole
attachments providing highly technical services that the commission
itself cannot even define.19 Finally, Part V concludes the Note by
arguing that in terms of policy considerations and practical applications,
the Supreme Court’s ruling in Gulf Power was not only correct, but it
may foreshadow the FCC’s taking a more hands-on approach to
regulating the wild, wild west of the information superhighway.20
II. BACKGROUND
In 1978, Congress adopted the Pole Attachments Act in response to

the court’s opinion, stating that the majority read too closely into the definitions put forth in the
statute, and that the Pole Attachments Act should extend regulated rates to all pole attachments. Id.
at 1280-81 (Carnes, J. dissenting). Judge Carnes’ dissent based the reasoning behind his view of
broad regulation by the FCC on the plain language of the statute. Id. This is similar to the
reasoning the Supreme Court used in their Gulf Power decision. See infra notes 73 – 85 and
accompanying text for a thorough discussion of the Supreme Court’s Gulf Power decision.
12. Gulf Power, 534 U.S. at 342.
13. See, e.g., Bill Scanlon, Bridging the Gap – Carriers Seek Better, More Profitable Ways to
Connect Customers to the Backbone (August 13, 2001) at http://www.eweek.com (last visited
March 5, 2003) (explaining that innovations in technology are running rampant in the race to get the
general public online with faster, more advanced equipment).
14. See infra Parts II-IV.
15. See infra notes 21 - 39 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 40 - 72 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 73 - 98 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 99 - 171 and accompanying text.
19. Id.
20. See infra notes 168-85 and accompanying text.
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the widespread consumer popularity of cable television.21 Congress
designed the Act to protect emerging cable companies from monopoly
pricing by the incumbent pole-owning utility companies.22 Cable
television systems rely on a physical, point to point connection23 to
provide their services to cable television subscribers.24 The most
practical means for this connection is to string cables above ground
using poles controlled by the local utilities.25 In turn, the utility
21. John P. Morrissey, Equal Access to Pole Attachment Agreements: Implications of
Telephone Company Participation in the Cable Television Market, 18 U. BALT. L. REV. 165, 16566 (1988). Cable television was invented in the 1950’s. Id. at 165. By the mid 1970’s almost
sixty-five percent of the nation’s homes were able to receive cable television. Id. at 166 n.10. By
1977, pole attachment disputes existed in twenty-seven states, and this prompted the intervention of
government regulation in 1978. Id. at 167 n.14. See also Jim Chen, The Authority to Regulate
Broadband Internet Access Over Cable, 16 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 677, 679 n.5 (2001) (citing In re
Annual Assessment of Competition for the Delivery of Video Programming, 15 F.C.C.R. 978, 98889 (2000)) (noting that in year 2000, cable reached more than ninety-six percent of all homes with
at least one television set). An offspring of cable television’s magnetism is the popularity of cable
modems as the consumer’s choice for high-speed Internet access. Id. at 679. In June 2000, almost
seventy percent of broadband subscribers in the United States reached the Internet through cable
modems. Id. (citing FCC, Fed. Communications Comm’n Releases Data on High-Speed Services
for Internet Access 8, tbl. 3, at http://www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/Common_Carrier/Reports/FCCState_Link/IAD/hspd1000.pdf (Oct. 31, 2000)). Its closest competition is digital subscriber lines
(DSL), which is a wire-based telephone line modem equivalent to a high-speed cable line modem.
Id. Chen noted that as of June 2000, DSL had twenty-eight percent of the market share. Id. These
statistics have almost inevitably changed since June 2000, as Chen himself notes, “three years is an
eternity in Internet time.” Id.
22. Implementation, supra note 7, at ¶ 2. (stating that the purpose of § 224 of the
Communications Act is to ensure that the deployment of communications networks and the
development of competition are not impeded by private ownership and control of the scarce
infrastructure and rights-of-way that many communications providers must use in order to reach
customers). See also Kelley, supra note 3, at 2158 (noting that it is curious that the Court of
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit did not wonder whether its interpretation of the congressional
intent behind § 224 was at odds with the congressional goals of increasing competition and ensuring
non-discrimination, both of which the court recognized in its opinion).
23. See Overview, supra note 2. An example of this physical, point to point connection is
“antennas located on hills . . . with connecting coaxial cables, strung on utility poles, to carry the
signals received by the antennas to the home television sets of individual subscribers.” Fortnightly
Corp. v. United Artists Television, Inc., 392 U.S. 390, 392 (1968).
24. Brief of Petitioner at 3, Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n, Inc. v. Gulf Power Co., 534
U.S. 327 (2002) (No. 00-832) available at 2001 WL 345196 (citing Turner Broadcasting Sys., Inc.
v. FCC, 512 U.S. 623, 628 (1994)). In Turner, the Court reviewed the mandatory must carry
provisions of the Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, Pub. L. 102385, 106 Stat. 1460, which require carriage of full power local broadcast stations on cable systems.
Turner, 512 U.S. at 630-32. The Court ruled that these provisions do not necessitate strict scrutiny
under the First Amendment because they are content-neutral regulations. Id. at 661.
25. FCC v. Fla. Power Corp., 480 U.S. 245, 254 (1987) (holding that the Pole Attachments
Act does not amount to a Fifth Amendment taking because it authorizes regulation of a voluntary
economic relationship). In 1978, approximately ninety-five percent of cable system providers’
cable lines were installed on utility companies’ poles. Brief of Petitioner at 11, Gulf Power (No. 00832). Cable operators were required to use existing poles, rather than construct a duplicate set of
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companies charge a rent to the cable and telecommunications companies
for attaching assorted devices to the utility owned poles.26 The FCC’s
regulation of this rent is designed to prevent utility company monopolies
and must comport with Congress’ general instructions to the FCC to
encourage
the
deployment
of
Internet
and
wireless
telecommunications.27
Originally, the 1978 Act defined a pole
attachment as “any attachment by a cable television system to a pole,
duct, conduit, or right-of-way owned or controlled by a utility.”28 In
1996, Congress reformed telecommunications law by amending the
original 1934 Communications Act, and expanded this definition of pole
attachments to include “any attachment by a . . . provider of
telecommunications service.”29
The Pole Attachments Act sets out two specific rate methodologies,
which the FCC must use to regulate rates when a cable or
telecommunications service provider cannot reach a mutual agreement
with the utility company charging rent for the pole attachment.30 One
poles, due to economic, environmental and zoning restrictions. Id. (citing H.R. REP. NO. 94-1640,
at 5 (1976) and H.R. REP. NO. 95-721, at 2 (1977)). In the twenty-four years since enactment of the
Pole Attachments Act, the situation remains relatively the same. Id. at 3. The most practical way
for cable companies to disseminate information and services to their customers is to attach their
equipment to utility company owned poles. Id. at 9.
26. Brief of Petitioner at 10-11, Gulf Power (No. 00-832). Typically, a pole-owning utility
company charges the company desiring to attach to the pole a flat rate per year for each pole the
company accesses. Overview, supra note 2. Rates range from $3.50 per pole per year to $38.00 per
pole per year. Id. at 5, 6.
27. 47 U.S.C. § 157(a) (2000) (stating that “[i]t shall be the policy of the United States to
encourage the provision of new technologies and services to the public”). See also 3 WEST’S FED.
ADMIN. PRAC. § 3536 (3d ed. 2001) (explaining that Congress designed the Telecommunications
Act of 1996 to promote competition and reduce regulation, and to encourage the rapid deployment
of new telecommunications technologies).
28. 47 U.S.C. § 224(b) (1990) (amended 1996). See also supra note 1 (defining “pole
attachments”).
29. 47 U.S.C. § 224(a)(4) (2000). See Brief for the Federal Petitioners at 3, Nat’l Cable &
Telecomms. Ass’n, Inc. v. Gulf Power Co., 534 U.S. 327 (2002) (No. 00-832, 00-843) (explaining
that the amended Telecommunications Act of 1996 comprehensively reformed regulation of the
entire communications industry); Rosemary C. Harold, Cable Open Access: Exorcising the Ghosts
of “Legacy” Regulation, 28 N. KY. L. REV. 721, 740-41 (2001) (indicating that Congress intended
the legislation to remove legal barriers between telecommunications companies and cable
companies doing business in the other’s respective industry). However, although the goal was a
“two-wire” world, Congress chose to maintain the statute’s separate distinctions between cable and
telecommunications services. Id.; Kelley, supra note 3, at 2139-40 (citing H.R. CONF. REP. NO.
104-204, at 48 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 10, 11) (stating that Congress thought
telephone companies competition with cable companies would allow consumers access to lower
rates, better quality service, improved maintenance and more diversity of information services).
30. Morrissey, supra note 21, at 175. See Implementation, supra note 2, at ¶ 9 (stating that §
224 applies when the parties fail to resolve a dispute over rate charges). The FCC “encourage[s]
parties to negotiate the rates, terms, and conditions of pole attachment agreements.” Id. See also
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section of the Act covers rate calculation guidelines for cable television
pole attachments,31 and another section provides a different set of
guidelines for telecommunications pole attachments.32 In addition, §
224(b)(1) of the Act, commonly referred to as the fallback provision,
grants general authority to the FCC to regulate rates for pole attachments
not covered by the Act’s aforementioned two specific provisions.33
Barbara Esbin, Internet Over Cable: Defining the Future in Terms of the Past, in 16TH ANNUAL
INSTITUTE ON TELECOMMUNICATIONS POLICY & REGULATION, at 289, 389 (PLI PATENTS,
COPYRIGHTS, TRADEMARKS, AND LITERARY PROPERTY, Course Handbook Series No. G4-4040,
Dec. 1998) available at WL 544 PLI/PAT 289 (noting that the pole attachment rental rates under §
224(d)(3) for cable services are lower than the pole attachment rental rates under § 224(e)(1) for
telecommunications services). In response to the changes made to the 1996 Act, cable companies
argued that they were entitled to the lower § (d)(3) rates because that regulation rate was designed to
apply to cable services. Id. The cable industry further argued that treating their attachments
otherwise would erect a barrier, in the form of higher pole attachment rental rates, to the
deployment of enhanced telecommunications and cable services. Id. at 389-90. The utility
companies disagreed, arguing that broadband Internet services over commingled cables are neither
telecommunications services, nor cable services, but rather are information services not entitled to
regulated pole attachment rates under § 224. Id. at 390.
31. 47 U.S.C. § 224(d)(1) (2000).
For purposes of subsection (b) of this section, a rate is just and reasonable if it assures a
utility the recovery of not less than the additional costs of providing pole attachments,
nor more than an amount determined by multiplying the percentage of the total usable
space, or the percentage of the total duct or conduit capacity, which is occupied by the
pole attachment by the sum of the operating expenses and actual capital costs of the
utility attributable to the entire pole, duct, conduit, or right-of-way.
Id. This range is more commonly referred to as the “not less than the incremental cost of adding a
particular attachment, nor more than the fully allocated costs of the pole” rate regulation. Nat’l
Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n, Inc. v. Gulf Power Co., 208 F.3d 1263, 1267 n.5 (11th Cir. 2000).
32. 47 U.S.C. § 224(e)(2) (2000).
A utility shall apportion the cost of providing space on a pole, duct, conduit, or
right-of-way other than the usable space among entities so that such apportionment
equals two-thirds of the costs of providing space other than the usable space that
would be allocated to such entity under an equal apportionment of such costs
among all attaching entities.
Id.
33. 47 U.S.C. § 224(b)(1) (2000) (stating that the Commission shall regulate the rates, terms
and conditions for pole attachments to provide that such rates, terms and conditions are just and
reasonable). The actual scope of this “fall back provision” is one issue that is disputed in the Gulf
Power case. Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n, Inc. v. Gulf Power Co., 534 U.S. 327, 337-39
(2002). The FCC, as well as the Supreme Court, concluded that §224(b)(1) is broad in scope, and
that it acts as a general authority to regulate pole attachment rates. Id. at 336 (holding that nothing
about the structure of the Act suggests that §§ 224(d) and (e) are the exclusive rates allowed). See
also Brief of Petitioner at 24-25, Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n. Inc. v. Gulf Power Co., 534
U.S. 327 (2002) (No. 00-832) (stating that §§ 224 (d) and (e) simply ensure that the pre-existing rate
structure of § 224(b)(1) would continue to apply to cable systems and telecommunications, by
identifying how the Commission is to implement their authority in two specific circumstances). But
see Brief for Respondent Fla. Power & Light Co. at 10, Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n. Inc. v.
Gulf Power Co., 534 U.S. 327 (2002) (No. 00-832) (concluding that the use of the word “solely” in
§ 224(d)(3) indicated Congress’ intent to limit the rate regulation to attachments by cable systems
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The nature of the pole attachment agreement is voluntary.34 Cable
television companies and telecommunications providers have no right to
attach to existing poles.35 However, if utility companies authorize an
attachment, the FCC can monitor the rates charged.36
The Pole Attachments Act itself has been fairly uncontroversial,
from its inception in 1978 until now.37 However, the importance of the
U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Gulf Power lies in the implications the
holding will have in areas far beyond mere pole attachments.38 This is
the first of the regulatory classification of information technology
services cases to go before the Supreme Court.39
used solely to provide cable services). The utility companies argued that § 224(b)(1) is limited only
to “reasonable” rates for the attachments falling into one of the two specific provisions, § (d)(3) for
commingled cable attachments and § 224(e)(2) for telecommunications attachments. Id. See also
Gulf Power, 208 F.3d at 1278 (holding that Congress authorized the FCC to regulate the rent of
attachments providing cable and telecommunications services, and because Internet service does not
meet either of those definitions, the 1996 Act does not authorize the FCC to regulate pole
attachments for Internet services).
34. Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n, Inc. v. Gulf Power Co., 208 F.3d 1263, 1267 (11th Cir.
2000).
35. Id.
36. See supra notes 31-34 and accompanying text for a discussion of how the FCC monitors
pole attachment rental rates.
37. Chen, supra note 21, at 692. Chen notes that, “[a] strange twist in statutory interpretation
has now thrust this formerly obscure controversy into the debate over cable broadband.” Id.
38. Kelley, supra note 3, at 2157 (criticizing the Eleventh Circuit’s failure to consider the
competitive consequences of its Gulf Power holding). Kelley argues that the court was so sure of
the plain meaning of the statute that it did not address the possible ramifications of its decision. Id.
“If the FCC could not restrain the rent for cable provided Internet access, the cable competitor
would be at a severe competitive disadvantage.” Id. Kelley argues that a telecommunications
carrier using pole attachments to provide Internet access is entitled to rates regulated by the FCC.
Id. However, the FCC could not restrain the rent charged to a cable company using similar pole
attachments to provide competing Internet access. Id. This stands in stark contrast to the policies
behind the Act. Implementation, supra note 7, at ¶ 2. See also supra notes 21-22 accompanying
text (discussing the policies behind the 1996 Act).
39. Harold, supra note 29, at 764-65 (stating that the definitions and classifications of “cable
service,” “telecommunications service,” “Internet service,” and “information service” are vague and
ambiguous). This vagueness is reflected by the federal regulatory agencies avoiding direct
confrontation of the issue. Id. at 763. In addition, the courts that have addressed this issue have
handed down inconsistent decisions. Compare MediaOne Group, Inc. v. County of Henrico, 97 F.
Supp. 2d 712, 715 (E.D. Va. 2000), aff’d on other grounds, 257 F.3d 256 (4th Cir. 2001)
(concluding that commingled cables offering both cable services and high-speed Internet access is a
cable service), with AT&T Corp. v. Portland, 216 F.3d 871, 878 (9th Cir. 2000) (concluding that
commingled cables offering both cable services and high-speed Internet access is a
telecommunications service). It may have been only by luck of the draw that the Supreme Court
granted certiorari to Gulf Power, to hopefully shed some light on this dark and murky area. But see
Chen, supra note 20, at 700 (arguing that the Supreme Court will probably reverse the Eleventh
Circuit’s “gross misinterpretation” of the Pole Attachments Act, without even deciding whether
commingled cable services are cable services, telecommunications services or neither). Chen urges
that the proper statutory classification for broadband Internet access over cable is an “information
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III. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Statement of Facts
In 1998, several utility companies40 challenged the FCC’s authority
to regulate certain pole attachments that were not covered in the literal
reading of the two specific rate provisions of § 224.41 The utility
companies claimed that the Act itself prohibited the FCC from
regulating wireless telecommunications systems (as opposed to wirebased systems) and commingled cable and high-speed Internet access
systems (as opposed to cables that provide cable television only).42 In
short, the utility companies argued that the FCC has no statutory
authority to regulate wireless telecommunication carriers or Internet
service providers under the Pole Attachments Act because of the literal,

service,” and eventually should be classified as such when applied to the huge arena of information
technology beyond relatively obscure pole attachments. Id.
40. Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n, Inc. v. Gulf Power Co., 208 F.3d 1263, 1266 (11th Cir.
2000). The utility companies involved in this case were Gulf Power Company, Alabama Power
Company, Georgia Power Company, Southern Company Services, Tampa Electric Company,
Potomac Electric Power Company, Virginia Electric & Power Company, Carolina Power & Light
Company, Duquesne Light Company, Delmarva Power & Light Company, Public Service Electric
& Gas Company, Houston Lighting & Power Company, Texas Utilities Electric Company,
American Electric Power Service Corporation, Commonwealth Edison Company, Duke Energy
Corporation, Union Electric Company, and Florida Power and Light Company. Id. at 1266 n.3.
41. Id. at 1271. On February 6, 1998, the FCC interpreted the scope of its authority to
regulate pole attachments to include attachments by Internet cable providers and wireless
telecommunications providers. Id. See Implementation, supra note 7, at ¶ 33-40. Several utility
companies, led by Gulf Power Co., brought an action in the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Florida. Gulf Power Co. v. United States, 1998 F. Supp. 1386, 1388 (N.D. Fla.
1998) (granting the defendant’s motion for summary judgment that the 1996 Act is valid under the
Fifth Amendment Takings Clause, and that allowing the FCC to determine just and reasonable
compensation does not violate the Separation of Powers doctrine). The utility companies appealed,
and a panel of the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling.
Gulf Power Co. v. United States, 187 F.3d 1324, 1338 (11th Cir. 1999) (Gulf Power I). In addition,
from March through July of 1998, various utility companies across the nation also filed petitions for
review in various courts of appeals. Gulf Power, 208 F.3d at 1270-71. Jurisdiction for this rate
review lies in the fact that the FCC’s final rate orders are subject to judicial review under 47 U.S.C.
§ 402(a) (2000) (providing for judicial review of FCC orders) and 28 U.S.C. §§ 2342, 2344 (2000)
(providing for judicial review of FCC orders in a United States Court of Appeals). Gulf Power, 208
F.3d at 1270. On August 4, 1998 the Eleventh Circuit granted the petitions for review,
consolidating them into one case. Id. at 1271. The petitioners in the case before the court of
appeals did not present the same challenges to the FCC’s orders as the plaintiffs did in Gulf Power I.
Id. Instead of attacking the 1996 Act under the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause or the Separation
of Powers doctrine, petitioners challenged the FCC’s statutory authority to regulate commingled
cable service providers and wireless telecommunications providers under § 224. Id. at 1271-1273.
42. Gulf Power, 208 F.3d at 1276.
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plain meaning of the statute.43
The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit agreed with the
utility companies’ position.44 The court reviewed this challenge to the
FCC’s interpretation of its own statute under the two-step Chevron
analysis.45 In Chevron v. Natural Res. Def. Council, the Supreme Court
ruled that courts should use this two-pronged analysis when reviewing
agency interpretations of their own statutes.46 Under step one of the
43. Id. See also Brief of the Site Owners and Managers Alliance of the Personal
Communications Indus. Ass’n as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents at 7-9, Nat’l Cable &
Telecomms. Ass’n, Inc. v. Gulf Power Co., 534 U.S. 327 (2002) (Nos. 00-832, 00843).
Despite the breadth of the phrase “any attachment,” it is apparent that Congress, the
cable industry, the FCC and utility companies universally understood that “any
attachment” by a cable system meant any “wire” attachment. Congress is presumed to
be aware of “existing law pertinent to the legislation it enacts.” Goodyear Atomic Corp.
v. Miller, 486 U.S. 174, 185 (1988). Pursuant to this venerable principle, this Court may
presume that Congress was cognizant of the industry’s construction of the term
“attachment” in 1978, and that it did not intend to apply the term “any attachment” to
wireless equipment . . . .
Id. at 8.
44. Gulf Power, 208 F.3d at 1278.
45. Id. at 1271. In Chevron, the Court held that Environmental Protection Agency regulations
allowing states to treat all pollution-emitting devices within the same industrial grouping was based
on a reasonable construction of the term “stationary source” in the Clean Air Act Amendments.
Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 842-845 (1984). See also Philip J.
Weiser, Chevron, Cooperative Federalism, and Telecommunications Reform, 52 VAND. L. REV. 1,
7-8 (1999) (stating that Chevron directs federal courts to “abstain from second-guessing a federal
agency’s reasonable interpretation of ambiguous statutory terms where the statutory scheme
assigned the implementation of its provisions to an expert agency”). Weiser refers to Chevron’s
holding as “one of the cornerstone principles of modern administrative law.” Id. Contra
Christensen v. Harris, 529 U.S. 576, 596 (2000) (Breyer, J. dissenting) (opining that Chevron made
“no relevant change” in administrative law). Justice Breyer stated that Chevron “simply focused
upon an additional, separate legal reason for deferring to certain agency determinations, namely that
Congress had delegated to the agency the legal authority to make those determinations.” Id. In Gulf
Power, the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit stressed that in first deciding whether an
ambiguity exists, normal rules of statutory construction are used without affording agency
interpretations any deference. Gulf Power, 208 F.3d at 1272.
46. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844-45. See also Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452 (1997) (holding
that agency deference is given to interpretations of agency regulations in addition to the statutes
governing the agency). In Auer, St. Louis police sergeants sued the City of St. Louis Board of
Police Commissioners under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) for overtime wage benefits. Id.
at 454. Under § 7(a)(1) of the FLSA, employers must pay overtime to employees who work more
than forty hours in a given week. 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1) (2000). However, under § 213(a)(1),
employees are not entitled to overtime compensation if they are exempted from the statute as a
“bona fide executive, administrative or professional.” 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(1). The Secretary of
Labor promulgated regulations to determine the requirements for exempt status under the statute.
Auer, 519 U.S. at 454. One regulation states that exempt status requires that the employee be paid
on a salary basis, and that his compensation not be subject to deductions based on disciplinary
actions taken by the employer. Id. at 456 (citing 29 C.F.R. § 541.118(a) (1996)). The police
sergeants contended that the “no disciplinary deductions” element of the regulation was invalid as it
applied to them because it reflected an unreasonable interpretation of the salary-basis exemption
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analysis, a determination must be made as to whether Congress has
spoken unambiguously to the question at hand.47 This is commonly
referred to as the plain meaning rule, and if this applies, the inquiry ends
here and courts give effect to Congress’ intent.48
Step two of the Chevron analysis is used only if a court determines
that the statute is silent on the issue at hand, or that Congress’ intent is
ambiguous.49 If so, courts give deference to the agency interpretation,
unless it is unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious.50 The Court of Appeals
for the Eleventh Circuit reasoned that the FCC’s regulations were
unambiguous in this situation, and therefore stopped at step one of the
Chevron analysis.51 The court concluded that no deference was owed to
the FCC’s statutory interpretation, and because the plain meaning of the
statute was clearly on the side of the utility companies, the FCC’s
interpretation of the statute was struck down.52
test. Id. at 457. The Court disagreed with the sergeants’ contentions, stating that “[t]here is simply
no reason to suspect that the interpretation does not reflect the agency’s fair and considered
judgment on the matter in question.” Id. at 462. Justice Scalia, writing for the Court, cited the
Chevron deference test as it applied to “permissible construction of the statute.” Id. at 457. The
Court held that it logically followed that the same deference be given to agency regulations. Id. at
462-63. “A rule requiring the Secretary to construe his own regulations narrowly would make little
sense, since he is free to write the regulations as broadly as he wishes, subject only to the limits
imposed by the statute.” Id. at 463.
47. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 843.
50. Id. at 843-44. The Court stated that “if the statute is silent or ambiguous . . . the question
for the court is whether the agency’s answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute.”
Id. at 843. Footnote 11 in Justice Stevens’ opinion accompanies this notion, stating that “[t]he court
need not conclude that the agency construction was the only one it permissibly could have adopted
to uphold the construction, or even the reading the court would have reached if the question initially
had arisen in a judicial proceeding.” Id. This deference doctrine affords agencies a considerable
amount of latitude in interpreting their own statutes. Id. at 844. “Deference means that a court must
be persuaded on the correctness of the agency’s interpretation of law in order for it to accept the
agency’s views.” CHARLES H. KOCH, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 369 (4th
ed. 2001). See also Richard Fallon, Of Legislative Courts, Administrative Agencies, and Article III,
101 HARV. L. REV. 915, 983-85 (1988) (explaining that although courts have the ultimate
responsibility of deciding questions of law, “no article III value forbids acknowledgment that,
concerning questions to which administrative expertise is relevant, the agency’s interpretation
furnishes a presumptively reliable indicator of how the question ought to be resolved”).
51. Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n, Inc. v. Gulf Power Co., 208 F.3d 1263, 1273 (11th Cir.
2000).
52. Id. (holding that the FCC’s regulatory power over utility companies is limited to pole
attachments, therefore interpreting §§ 224(d) and (e) broadly is contrary to the Commission’s
narrow authority in this area). However, Judge Carnes’ dissent takes issue with the majority’s
reasoning. Id. at 1281 (Carnes, J. dissenting). The dissent argues that although the majority
claimed to have relied on the unambiguous statutory language, thus stopping at step one of the
Chevron analysis, the opinion went on to discuss legislative history under step two of the Chevron
analysis to justify its conclusion. Id. This is contradictory to the Supreme Court’s well-recognized
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According to the Eleventh Circuit, the FCC had no statutory
authority to regulate pole attachments by Internet service providers
through commingled cables or attachments by wireless communications
providers.53
B. Procedural History
Procedurally, these two claims were asserted in one case, but
The utility
substantively, they are best looked at separately.54
companies’ arguments have two distinct flavors: one for wireless
telecommunications and one for commingled cable and Internet
systems.55
1. Wireless Telecommunications
The utility companies argued, and the Eleventh Circuit agreed, that
attachments for wireless communications are excluded from the Act by
negative implication.56 The court found that the 1934 Communications
Act originally covered only wire and radio communications.57 The court
concluded that the statutory definition of “utility”58 restricted the Act’s
holding in Chevron, which the majority purports to follow. Id. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural
Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 842-45 (1984). See also Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U.S. 135,
147-48 (1994) (explaining that “we do not resort to legislative history to cloud a statutory text that is
clear”). See supra note 45 for an additional discussion of Chevron.
53. Gulf Power, 208 F.3d at 1273.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 1273-4. See also F. REED DICKERSON, THE INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF
STATUTES 9-10 (1975) (defining a negative implication as an implication that “denies outside the
area of express coverage what is expressly asserted within it”). The negative implication doctrine is
asserted in the Latin maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius. Id. However, the Supreme Court
has repeatedly held that the negative implication doctrine does not apply to every statute. “[T]he
canon expressio unius est exclusio alterius . . . has force only when the items expressed are
members of an ‘associated group or series,’ justifying the inference that items not mentioned were
excluded by deliberate choice, not inadvertence.” Barnhart v. Peabody Coal Co., 537 U.S. 149, 168
(2003) (citing U.S. v. Vonn, 535 U.S. 55, 65 (2002)); see also Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Echazabal,
536 U.S. 73, 81 (2002) (stating that “exclusion demonstration” is the extrastatutory ingredient
requiring a series of terms within a statute that can be understood to go hand in hand); Barnhart,
537 U.S. at 168 (holding that the courts should not find an exclusion “unless it is fair to suppose that
Congress considered the unnamed possibility and meant to say no to it”); Bingler v. Johnson, 394
U.S. 741, 749 (1969) (holding that certain tax exempt organizations were exceptions only because
they were expressly set out in the statute, and that no additional restrictions may be put on these
basic exclusions).
57. Gulf Power, 208 F.3d at 1273.
58. 47 U.S.C. § 224(a)(1) (2000) (defining utility as “any person . . . who owns or controls
poles, ducts, conduits, or rights-of way used, in whole or in part, for any wire communications”)
(emphasis added).
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regulatory power to attachments used for wire-based communications.59
In 1978, Congress explicitly extended the FCC’s authority to regulate
utility companies’ charges to cable system providers, by enacting the
Pole Attachments Act.60 When Congress amended the Act in 1996, it
once again expanded the FCC’s jurisdiction, this time to cover
attachments by telecommunications providers.61 However, in Gulf
Power the Eleventh Circuit found that wireless systems are not akin to
wireline systems,62 relying on an FCC Administrative Report that stated,
“[t]here are potential difficulties in applying the Commission’s rules to
59. Gulf Power, 208 F.3d at 1274 (reasoning that the language of § 224 plainly states that
attachments may be made to poles used for wire communications). See also 47 U.S.C. § 153 (51)
(2000) (defining wire communications as the transmission of writing, signs, signals, pictures, and
sounds of all kinds by aid of wire, cable, or other like connection between the points of origin and
reception of such transmission, including all instrumentalities, facilities, apparatus, and services
(among other things, the receipt, forwarding, and delivery of communications) incidental to such
transmission). The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit commented that before the 1978 Pole
Attachments Act, the fact that a cable service provider found it convenient to attach equipment to a
utility company owned pole, as opposed to a telephone company owned pole, was not a sufficient
basis for the authority to regulate. Gulf Power, 208 F.3d at 1274. It was not until 1978, when
Congress expanded the FCC’s jurisdiction to include regulation of attachment rental rates charged
by pole owning utility companies, that cable companies were entitled to regulated rates for attaching
to utility company owned poles. Id. The court attempts to analogize the cable situation in 1978 to
the wireless situation today, by saying that while it may be convenient for wireless carriers to attach
to utility poles, it is not necessary. Id. at 1275.
60. 47 U.S.C. § 224 (b) (2000). See also supra notes 1, 33 and accompanying text (discussing
§ 224(b)).
61. Gulf Power, 208 F.3d at 1274. See 47 U.S.C. § 224(e)(1) (2000), supra note 5.
62. Gulf Power, 208 F.3d at 1275. The court reasoned that the purpose behind the Pole
Attachments Act was to prevent a monopoly by pole owning utility companies, when the poles are
bottleneck facilities (emphasis added). Id. A “bottleneck” is an essential facility which enables an
entity to exploit market power in one market, thus illegitimately promoting monopoly power in a
related or distinct market in violation of antitrust law. Steven Ferrey, Deregulation of Power v.
Anticompetitive Practices 1 L. OF INDEPENDENT POWER 10:56 (2002). See also AT&T Corp. v.
Iowa Utility Board, 525 U.S. 366, 388 (1999) (defining a “bottleneck facility” as synonymous with
the essential facilities doctrine of antitrust law); MCI Communication v. A.T.T., 708 F.2d 1081,
1132-33 (7th Cir. 1983) (identifying the four elements required to meet the test of the essential
facilities doctrine as: (1) control of the essential facility by a monopolist; (2) a competitor’s inability
practically or reasonably to duplicate the essential facility; (3) denial of the use of the facility to a
competitor; and (4) the feasibility of providing the facility). The Eleventh Circuit went on to say
that utility owned poles are not bottleneck facilities for wireless carriers, in that the poles are not
essential. Gulf Power, 208 F.3d at 1275. Most wireless equipment can be placed on top of tall
buildings or towers. Id. The court also reasoned that in § 332 of the 1996 Telecommunications Act,
the placement of wireless equipment may be regulated by state and local governments. Id. See 47
U.S.C. § 332(7)(B)(i)(I) and (II) (2000) (requiring state and local governments to be nondiscriminatory when acting on requests to site wireless equipment, and limiting the reasons a state
can put forth for determining where wireless carriers can locate their equipment). Therefore, the
Eleventh Circuit interpreted § 332 to mean that Congress did not intend § 224 to authorize federal
regulation of the placement of wireless equipment, in addition to regulation by the state and local
governments. Gulf Power, 208 F.3d at 1275.
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wireless pole attachments.”63 Therefore, the Eleventh Circuit concluded
that the FCC lacked authority to regulate wireless carriers.64
2. Commingled Cable Services
The Eleventh Circuit found that neither of the specific rate formulas
identified in the Act covered commingled cable and Internet services.65
The court first classified commingled services as an Internet service, and
then determined that an Internet service does not qualify as a cable
service or as a telecommunications service.66
However, the FCC contended that Congress’ use of the word
“any”67 in the Pole Attachments Act was evidence of intent for the FCC
to broadly regulate pole attachments.68 The FCC argued that, regardless
63. Implementation, supra note 7, at ¶ 41. See infra notes 66 - 68 and accompanying text
(explaining how the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit took this FCC statement out of
context). See also Implementation, supra note 7, at ¶ 39 (stating that “wireless carriers are entitled
to the benefits and protection of § 224”).
64. Gulf Power, 208 F.3d at 1279.
65. Id. at 1276.
66. Id. at 1276-77. The first rate regulation formula in the Act applies to “any attachment
used by a cable television system solely to provide cable service.” 47 U.S.C. § 224(d)(3) (2000)
(emphasis added). Commingled services provide both cable television services and high-speed
Internet access. Gulf Power, 208 F.3d at 1276. The court determined that these two functions were
not solely cable services. Id. Therefore, the word “solely” in § 224(d)(3) narrowed the general
definition of pole attachments. Id. The second rate formula applies to “pole attachments used by
telecommunications carriers to provide telecommunications services.” 47 U.S.C. § 224(e)(1)
(2000). The majority concluded that commingled services are not telecommunications services,
relying on the FCC’s own conclusion that Internet service is not the provision of a
telecommunications service under the 1996 Act. Gulf Power, 208 F.3d at 1277-78. See
Implementation, supra note 7, at ¶ 33 (concluding that Internet service is not a telecommunications
service); see also In re Fed.-State Joint Bd. on Universal Serv., 12 F.C.C.R. 8776, 1997 WL
236383, § XIII(B)(2)(a)(780) (1997) (listing examples of telecommunications services as, inter alia,
cellular telephone and paging services; mobile radio services; wide area telephone services
(WATS); toll-free services; 900 services; and telex and telegraph services).
67. See supra notes 1 - 3 (defining 47 U.S.C. §§224(a)(4), (d)(3) (2000)). In his dissent in
Gulf Power, Judge Carnes cited Merritt v. Dillard Paper Co., 120 F.3d 1181, 1186 (11th Cir. 1997),
and argued that the word “any” is not ambiguous and has a well established, expansive meaning.
Gulf Power 208 F.3d at 1280 (Carnes, J., dissenting). Applying this to the sections of 224 at hand,
the FCC has the authority to regulate all attachments, “by a cable television system or provider of
telecommunication service to a pole, duct, conduit or right-of-way owned or controlled by a utility”.
Id. “Obviously, ‘all attachments’ includes those attachments used to provide wireless and Internet
services.” Id. As discussed in Gulf Power the Supreme Court followed, among other things, Judge
Carnes’ sole dissent on this point. Supra note 10 and accompanying text.
68. Gulf Power 208 F.3d at 1274). The FCC argued that any attachment made by either a
cable television provider or a telecommunications service provider may be regulated by § 224, no
matter what kind of attachment it is. Brief for the Federal Petitioners at 13-15, Nat’l Cable &
Telecomms. Ass’n, Inc. v. Gulf Power Co., 534 U.S. 327 (2002) (No. 00-832, 00-843) (arguing that
once it is determined that a utility pole is subject to the Act because it is used for
telecommunications or cable services, the Act makes no further distinction based on the type of
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of the definition, commingled cable services are subject to regulation
under the fall back provision of § 224(b)(1), which authorizes the FCC
to “ensure that the rates, terms, and conditions [for pole attachments] are
just and reasonable.”69 The Eleventh Circuit disagreed with the FCC,
and ruled that § 224(b)(1) did not apply to Internet services.70
Finally, the FCC urged the Eleventh Circuit to follow the District of
Columbia Circuit’s ruling in Texas Utilities Electric Co.71, where the
Pole Attachments Act was found to be ambiguous, and under step two of
the Chevron analysis, deference was given to the agency’s
interpretation.72 Once again, the Eleventh Circuit declined to side with
the FCC, holding that the statute was unambiguous under Chevron.73
facility used to provide the services). The Eleventh Circuit disagreed with the FCC’s contention,
and concluded that the FCC had narrow authority to regulate power companies. Gulf Power, 208
F.3d at 1276. As discussed this is one of the points that the Supreme Court overrules in Gulf Power.
Infra notes 75-87 and accompanying text.
69. Gulf Power, 208 F. 3d at 1276. See supra note 33 (defining § 224(b)(1) (2002)). See also
74 AM. JUR. 2D Telecommunications § 174 (May 2002) (stating that “in setting the charge for
attachment of cable television lines to utility company poles, the Commission’s action is to be
judged on the basis of reasonableness of method used to compute the pole attachment rate, not
merely by whether the ultimate result fell within the range allowed by statute”).
70. Gulf Power, 208 F. 3d at 1276. The court reasoned that for § 224(b)(1) to apply to a pole
attachment, that attachment must first fall under § 224(d)(3) (cable services), or under § 224(e)(1)
(telecommunications services). Id. at 1277. In opposition to the FCC’s assertion that § 224(b)(1) is
a broad provision designed to mandate the agency’s authority over pole attachments, the court
concluded that §§ 224(d) and (e) have the effect of narrowing § 224(b)(1)’s general mandate to only
setting just and reasonable rates. Id. “The straightforward language of subsections (d) and (e)
directs the FCC to establish two specific just and reasonable rates, one for cable television systems
providing solely cable service and one for telecommunications carriers providing
telecommunications service; no other rates are authorized.” Id. at 1277 n.29.
71. Texas Utilities Electric Co. v. FCC, 997 F.2d 925 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
72. Gulf Power, 208 F.3d at 1277 n.32. In Texas Utilities, the court deferred to the FCC’s
interpretation that commingled services were within the ambit of § 224, using step two of the
Chevron analysis, discussed supra note 45. Texas Utilities, 997 F.2d at 932. The D.C. Circuit court
reasoned that the 1978 Act was ambiguous because it did not differentiate between the type of
service the attachment provided, and the type of entity doing the attaching. Id. at 930-32. The
Eleventh Circuit, in Gulf Power, distinguished Texas Utilities, since Texas Utilities was decided
before the 1996 amendments to the Telecommunications Act. Gulf Power, 208 F.3d at 1277 n.32.
73. Gulf Power, 208 F.3d at 1277. See supra note 45 (describing the Chevron case). The
Gulf Power court relied on the 1996 amendment to § 224(d)(3), which states that “solely cable
services” receive rent regulations, to determine that the statute was unambiguous. Gulf Power, 208
F.3d at 1277. The court determined that Congress intended the “type of service provided” to be
emphasized for regulation, over the “type of entity acquiring the attachment,” and that by changing
the language Congress intended to narrow the scope of application. Id. at n.32 The court also
applied the plain language argument to another 1996 amendment to the Act. Id. at 1277. In § 522,
cable service is defined as “the one-way transmission to subscribers of (i) video programming, or
(ii) other programming service, and subscriber interaction, if any, which is required for the selection
or use of such video programming or other programming service.” 47 U.S.C. § 522(6)(A), (B)
(2000) (emphasis added). The only part of the definition that changed from the 1978 Act to the
1996 Act was the addition of the phrase “or use.” Gulf Power, 208 F.3d at 1277. The court pointed
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The court concluded that the FCC lacked the authority to regulate
Internet services under the 1996 Telecommunications Act.74
C. U.S. Supreme Court Decision
1. Majority
The Supreme Court first addressed the question of whether the Pole
Attachments Act applied to attachments that provide commingled cable
and Internet services.75 Using step one of the Chevron analysis, Justice
Kennedy, writing for the majority, found the Pole Attachments Act
unambiguous as applied to commingled cable services.76 However, the
Supreme Court reached the opposite conclusion as the Eleventh Circuit
and held that attachments by commingled cable service providers do fall
within the FCC’s authority to regulate.77 The Court then expanded the
Chevron analysis, and stated in the alternative that, if the statute is found
to be ambiguous, the utility companies cannot prove that the FCC’s
interpretation is unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious.78
The Supreme Court rejected the Eleventh Circuit’s restrictive
reading of the Pole Attachments Act, stating that the two narrow
subsections, §§ 224(d)(3) and (e)(1), are “simply subsets of, but not
limitations upon” the broader §§ 224(a)(4) and (b)(1).79 The Court went
out that this change was minor, and nothing in the legislative history of the Act indicated that
Congress intended to broaden the scope of a cable service. Id. at 1276. In finding that a minor
change in language does not lead to a major statutory shift, the Gulf Power court relied on the
Supreme Court’s decision in Walters v. Nat’l Ass’n of Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. 305 (1985).
Gulf Power, 208 F.3d at 1276-77. See Walters, 473 U.S. at 318 (stating that without substantive
comment, “it is generally held that a change during codification is not intended to alter the statute’s
scope”) (citing Muniz v. Hoffman, 422 U.S. 454, 467-74 (1975)).
74. Gulf Power, 208 F.3d at 1279.
75. Gulf Power, 534 U.S. at 331.
76. Id. In deciding that the statute was unambiguous, the Court turned to §§ 224(b) and
(a)(4), and concluded that what matters under the statute is the entity the attachment is “by.” Id. In
other words, a pole attachment attached by a cable television company is an attachment by a cable
television system, for the purposes of § 224. Id. This situation does not change if that cable one
day provides high-speed Internet access. Id. The Supreme Court’s ruling on this point is in direct
opposition to the Eleventh Circuit’s holding on the same issue. See supra note 73.
77. Gulf Power, 534 U.S. at 334. See also supra note 60 and accompanying text (discussing
the circuit court’s holding).
78. Id. at 331, 338.
79. Id. at 336. The Court stated that the Eleventh Circuit had no foundation for their narrow
interpretation of the sections at issue. Id. at 336-37. The plain language of §§ 224(a)(4) and (b)(1)
leads to a broad reading. Id. Nothing about the Act suggests that the two specific rate categories,
one for attachments used by a cable television system solely to provide cable services (§ 224(d)(3))
and one for attachments used by telecommunications carriers to provide telecommunications
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on to explain that the trend has been for Congress to expand the FCC’s
jurisdiction, starting with the 1996 reformation of the
Telecommunications Act.80 The Supreme Court granted certiorari only
to determine the scope of §§ 224(a) and (b), and not to define the
limitations of the more specific §§ 224(d)(3) and (e)(1).81 The Court
specifically declined to categorize Internet services as either cable
services or telecommunications service, because regardless, what was at
issue was a pole attachment, and thus it is within the FCC’s reach.82
Next, the Court addressed the question of whether pole attachments
by wireless telecommunications providers, consisting distinctively of
wireless rather than wire-based equipment, are within the reach of FCC
regulation.83 The Court used concise reasoning to answer in the
services (§ 224(e)(1)), are the exclusive rates allowed. Id. “The sum of the transactions addressed
by the rate formulas . . . is less than the theoretical coverage of the Act as a whole.” Id. at 336.
80. Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n, Inc. v. Gulf Power, Co., 534 U.S. 327, 336 (2002). The
Court reasoned that if cable television systems that also provide Internet services are now outside
the scope of § 224(d)(3) because they may provide more than “solely” cable services, the result of
the analysis still does not change. Id. at 335. Pole attachments for cable television systems that also
provide Internet services are still covered by §§ 224(a)(4) and (b). Id.
81. Id. at 337.
82. Id. The FCC, on the other hand, went a step further and decided that Internet services
were not telecommunications services. Id. See Implementation, supra note 7, at ¶ 33 (stating that
“a cable television system providing Internet service over a commingled facility is not a
telecommunications carrier subject to the revised rate mandated by § 224(e) by virtue of providing
Internet service”). However, the FCC found it did not need to decide whether Internet services were
cable service.
Regardless of whether such commingled services constitute “solely cable services”
under § 224(d)(3), we believe that the subsection (d) rate should apply. If the provision
of such services over a cable television system is a “cable service” under § 224(d)(3),
then the rate encompassed by that section would clearly apply. Even if the provision of
Internet service over a cable television system is deemed to be neither ‘cable service’ nor
‘telecommunications service’ under the existing definitions, the Commission is still
obligated under § 224(b)(1) to ensure that the ‘rates, terms and conditions are just and
reasonable,’ and we would, in our discretion, apply the subsection (d) rate as a ‘just and
reasonable rate.’
Id.
The Court did not fault the FCC for taking this approach, commenting that, “decision makers
sometimes dodge hard questions when easier ones are dispositive.” Gulf Power, 534 U.S. at 338.
See discussion infra notes 88 - 100 and accompanying text (explaining how Justice Thomas’ dissent
shows why this may have negative implications in the vast area of information services in the
future).
83. Gulf Power, 534 U.S. at 339. This question is a bit narrower than the question presented
to the lower court. Id. at 340. The original question was whether any equipment attached by
wireless carriers was subject to FCC regulation of pole attachments. Id. at 332. The Eleventh
Circuit held that “the act does not provide the FCC with authority to regulate wireless carriers.”
Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n, Inc. v. Gulf Power 208 F.3d 1263, 1275 (11th Cir. 2000).
Because it is obvious that if a wireless provider attaches a wire-based facility to a utility pole, that
attachment falls within § 224, the Supreme Court stated that all parties now agree that the court of
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affirmative.84 First, the Court stated that, similar to commingled cables,
wireless attachments are subject to regulation under §§ 224(a)(4) and
(b), even if they don’t fall squarely within the definition of § 224(e)(1).85
It is apparent from the amount of time the Court spent on the
commingled cable issue, as opposed to the wireless telecommunications
issue, that broadband Internet access over commingled cables is the
more controversial subject.86 This conclusion is also reflected in the
concurrence and dissent.87
2. Concurrence and Dissent
Justice Thomas, joined by Justice Souter, concurred in part and
dissented in part in the Gulf Power decision.88 Justice Thomas
concurred with the majority’s decision that the Pole Attachments Act
grants the FCC jurisdiction to regulate attachments by wireless
telecommunications providers.89 However, he dissented on the issue of
whether the Act gives the FCC authority to regulate attachments
providing commingled cable television service and high-speed Internet
access.90 The dissent recommended vacating and remanding this issue to
the FCC to explain clearly the statutory basis for regulation of
commingled cable attachment rates, and to statutorily categorize
commingled cable services.91
appeals’ original holding was overstated. Gulf Power, 534 U.S. at 339.
84. Id. The Court held “we address only whether pole attachments that carry commingled
services are subject to FCC regulation at all. The question is answered by §§ 224(a)(4) and (b), and
the answer is yes.” Id. at 338.
85. Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n, Inc. v. Gulf Power Co.. 534 U.S. 327, 334-35 (2002).
The utility companies, as well as the Eleventh Circuit, relied on the argument that poles are not
bottleneck facilities for wireless attachments. Id. at 335. See supra note 61 (defining “bottleneck
facilities”). The Court rejected that argument, holding that the FCC was not unreasonable in its
regulation. Id. at 338. In any event, even if the text were ambiguous, under Chevron the Court
would defer to the FCC’s interpretation on this technical and complex question. Id. at 339.
86. Id. at 331-35. The Supreme Court’s reasoning as to the utility companies’ proposed
distinction between wire-based attachments and wireless attachments consists of five short
paragraphs. Id. at 334-35. The Court dismissed the distinction as having no statutory support,
being difficult to draw and being overly burdensome on the FCC. Id. On the other hand, the
Court’s discussion of commingled Internet access cables spans twenty-one paragraphs. Id. at 33134.
87. See infra notes 88 - 100 and accompanying text for a discussion of Justice Thomas’
dissent.
88. See Gulf Power, 534 U.S. at 347-61 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
89. Gulf Power, 534 U.S. at 347 (Thomas, J., concurring).
90. Id. In his dissent, Justice Thomas acknowledged that the majority’s conclusion “may be
correct,” but that he was not satisfied with their reasoning. Id.
91. Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n, Inc. v. Gulf Power Co., 534 U.S. 327, 347 (2002)
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Justice Thomas reasoned that unless commingled cable services are
defined, so that a court can conclude whether or not they fall within the
ambit of either two specific rate provisions, the issue of the more general
§§ 224(a)(4) and (b)(1)’s scope is, “nothing more than a tempest in a
teapot.”92 Because the two specific rate provisions provide mandatory
methodologies if applicable, it is necessary to first decide whether an
attachment falls into one of the two categories.93 If, and only if, this
determination is made in the negative can the Court logically review
whether the fall back provisions of §§ 224(a)(4) and (b)(1) apply.94 The
dissent concluded that remanding the case to the FCC for further
classification of the terms at issue is the proper course of action.95
The dissent’s reasoning for remanding the decision on the issue of
defining cable modem services is two-fold. First, the dissent disagreed
(Thomas, J., dissenting). The dissent concedes that the majority may be correct in their ruling
regarding commingled cable services, but states that remanding the issue to the FCC would “require
the Commission to decide at long last whether high-speed Internet access provided through cable
wires constitutes cable service or telecommunications service or falls into neither category.” Id.
This disparity in legal reasoning is the crux of Gulf Power’s importance in FCC regulation of
information technology service providers, including telecommunications companies, utility
companies, cable companies and Internet service providers (ISPs). See supra notes 101 - 172 and
accompanying text for a detailed discussion and analysis of the implications of the Gulf Power
decision.
92. Gulf Power, 534 U.S. at 348 (Thomas, J., dissenting). “Tempest in a teapot” (or teacup)
traces its origin to the Latin saying excitare fluctus in simpulo, meaning “to stir up a tempest in a
small ladle,” hence, to storm about over trifles, to make much ado about nothing. CHARLES EARLE
FUNK, CURIOUS WORD ORIGINS, SAYINGS & EXPRESSIONS, 528 (Galahad Books 1993).
93. Id. at 348. See supra note 27 (explaining the ninth and fourth Circuits’ inconsistent
definitions of commingled cable services as telecommunications services and cable services,
respectively). But see Implementation, supra note 7, at ¶ 34 (ordering that § 224(d)(3) rates apply to
commingled cable services, regardless of whether they constitute solely cable services). The
commission stated that the lower § 224(d)(3) rate “will encourage greater competition in the
provision of Internet service and greater benefits to consumers.” Id. at ¶ 32.
94. Gulf Power, 534 U.S. at 349 (Thomas, J., dissenting). See Permian Basin Area Rate
Cases, 390 U.S. 747, 792 (1968) (holding that “[j]udicial review of [an agency’s] orders will . . .
function accurately and efficaciously only if the [agency] indicates fully and carefully the methods
by which . . . it has chosen to act”).
95. Gulf Power, 534 U.S. at 351 (Thomas, J., dissenting). The dissent cites the Federal
Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2000), to support its reasoning, which states:
To the extent necessary to decision and when presented, the reviewing court shall decide
all relevant questions of law, interpret constitutional and statutory provisions, and
determine the meaning or applicability of the terms of an agency action. The reviewing
court shall . . . (2) hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions
found to be (A) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion or otherwise not in
accordance with law.
Id. This proposition seems to reach a similar conclusion as step two of the Chevron analysis, used
when a statute is found to be ambiguous. See supra note 45 (discussing the Chevron analysis).
However, the dissent fails to cite Chevron in its opinion. See Gulf Power, 534 U.S. at 347-61
(Thomas, J. concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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with the majority’s finding that the FCC had already decided high-speed
Internet access via cable modems is not a telecommunications service.96
Second, it is unknown if a theoretical attachment exists that is covered
under the Pole Attachments Act’s §§ 224(a)(4) and (b)(1), but is not
covered by either of the Act’s specific rate methodologies.97
Interestingly, the dissent concluded that, nonetheless, it is likely that the
FCC has authority to regulate commingled cable and Internet service
attachments.98 The legislative history and policy behind the 1996
Telecommunications Act, to encourage the dissemination of information
technology, point in that direction.99 However, according to Justice
Thomas, legislative history and policy do not excuse the FCC’s “failure
to engage in reasoned decision making.”100
IV. ANALYSIS
The Gulf Power decision is a step toward bringing high-speed
96. Gulf Power, 534 U.S. at 352 (Thomas, J., dissenting). The FCC stated “we have not yet
established the regulatory classification of Internet services provided over cable television
facilities.” In re Federal-State Joint Board on Universal Service, 13 F.C.C.R. 11501, 11534, 1998
WL 166178, ¶ 69 n.140 (1998). See also Brief for the Federal Petitioners at 29-30, Nat’l Cable &
Telecomms. Ass’n, Inc. v. Gulf Power Co., 534 U.S. 327 (2002) (No. 00-832, 00-843) (stating that
to date, the FCC has taken no position on the issue of whether an Internet service is a “cable
service,” a “telecommunications service,” or “some other kind of service”).
97. Gulf Power, 534 U.S. at 356-57 (Thomas, J. dissenting). The Court’s opinion notes that
the literal reading of “any attachment” is “absurd.” Id. at 341. The respondents argue that any
attachment surely cannot mean a billboard or a clothesline, therefore “any” should be a limiting
word. Id. The Court rejects this theory, saying “attachments of other sorts may be examined by the
[FCC] in the first instance.” Id. The dissent criticized the majority’s conclusion that “the sum of
the transactions addressed by the rate formulas . . . is less than the theoretical coverage of the Act as
a whole.” Id. at 357. See also supra note 79 (discussing the Court’s broad theoretical coverage of
the statute). The dissent argued that it is not conducive to proper judicial review to consider the
scope of a statutory provision in the abstract. Gulf Power, 534 U.S. at 359 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
“Knowing the size and composition of the universe of attachments not addressed by the Act’s two
specific rate methodologies, however, would be extremely useful in evaluating the reasonableness
of the FCC’s position that it may regulate rates for those attachments.” Id.
98. Id. at 359-60.
99. Id. at 360. See supra notes 21 - 22 and accompanying text for a discussion of the policy
behind the 1996 Act.
100. Id. at 360 (Thomas, J., dissenting). The importance of classification lies in the difference
between the two categories’ rate methodologies. Id. at 361. Rates calculated pursuant to § 224(e)
(telecommunications services) are generally higher than rates calculated under § 224(d)
(commingled cable services). Id. at 361 n.12. What category high-speed Internet access using cable
modem technology falls into may determine whether or not the applicable rate is “just and
reasonable.” Id. See also Esbin, supra note 30, at 389 (explaining that under § 224, cable operators
providing cable services will pay lower pole attachment rates than cable operators providing
telecommunications services). Esbin notes that if cable service providers that offer commingled
Internet access are seen as anything but “cable providers” this will result in higher pole rents and
undermine the purpose of the 1996 Act to encourage the deployment of information services. Id.
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Internet access and other information technology services to consumers
at a lower price, through pro-competitive FCC regulation.101 After Gulf
Power, the FCC can now regulate rental rates for pole attachments that
provide more than just traditional telephone and cable services.102 This
regulatory expansion is consistent with the congressional policies behind
the enactment of the 1978 Pole Attachments Act.103 The Court’s
decision to allow FCC regulation of pole attachments for wireless
telecommunications, as an extension of wire-based telecommunications,
was a natural, and not particularly controversial, progression.104
Wireless telecommunications, such as cellular telephones, obviously
come within the reach of FCC regulation.105 On the other hand, the
question of how pole attachments for broadband Internet access via
commingled cables should be regulated by the FCC is not so easily
answered.106
This Note will now analyze the impact of the Court’s decision to
allow FCC regulation of pole attachments for commingled cable and
high-speed Internet service providers.107 It will consider why broad
101. See Gulf Power, 534 U.S. at 339 (holding that if the FCC did not have jurisdiction to
regulate commingled cable services “a cable company [that] attempts to innovate at all and provide
anything other than pure television . . . loses the protection of the Pole Attachments Act and subjects
itself to monopoly pricing”). The Court supports its holding by referring to the congressional policy
behind the 1996 amendments to the Act “to accelerate deployment of such capability by removing
barriers to infrastructure investment.” Id. See also Michael I. Meyerson, Ideas of the Marketplace:
A Guide to the 1996 Telecomms. Act, 49 FED. COMM. L.J. 251, 287 (1997) (noting that the 1996 Act
is complex in that it is simultaneously detailed and incomplete). “The Act contemplates the creation
of competition across the full telecommunications field, even in areas such as local telephone
service and cable television service that had previously been monopoly controlled.” Id. The Act
needs to ensure that if the information service providing industry becomes a battlefield for large
diversified companies, there will still be a place for the small player. Id. at 288.
102. Gulf Power, 534 U.S. at 342. “The attachments at issue in this suit – ones which provide
commingled cable and Internet service and ones which provide wireless telecommunications – fall
within the heartland of the Act.” Id.
103. See supra notes 21 - 22 and accompanying text for a discussion of the policy behind the
Act.
104. See Gulf Power, 534 U.S. at 339-40. In the majority opinion, Justice Kennedy discussed
the Eleventh Circuit’s holding that the Act does not provide the FCC with authority to regulate
wireless carriers, and stated that “[a]ll parties now agree this holding was overstated.” Id. at 349.
The dissent agreed with the Court’s holding that the FCC does have jurisdiction to regulate wireless
providers’ pole attachment rates. Id. at 347 (Thomas, J. dissenting). The petitioner’s brief to the
Supreme Court further supports this view, by arguing that any attachment by a provider of
telecommunications services is covered by the Act. Brief of Petitioner at 14, Nat’l Cable &
Telecomms. Ass’n, Inc. v. Gulf Power. Co., 534 U.S. 327 (2002) (No. 00-832).
105. See Gulf Power, 534 U.S. at 334-38.
106. Brief of Petitioner at 14-15, Gulf Power, (No. 00-832).
107. Historically, FCC cable rate regulation has always been a controversial topic. Meyerson,
supra note 101, at 270 (discussing the 1992 – 1999 battle in the cable industry over regulation of
“basic” service and regulation of “cable programming” service). “Basic” cable offered broadcast
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regulation and liberal deference should be afforded to agency
interpretation of statutes governing, not just pole attachments, but also
high technology industries in their entirety.108 Additionally, it will
examine the anti-monopoly approach, expanding far beyond the Pole
Attachments Act, that the Court used in reaching the Gulf Power
decision.109
Finally, it will analyze the economic and policy
considerations of Gulf Power from both the cable companies’ point of
view and the pole owning utility companies’ perspective.110
A. Broad Regulation for Information Technology
The Chevron analysis has generally been applied more liberally to
FCC interpretations of statutes governing high technology.111 For

channels and public, educational and government access programming. Id. “Basic” cable was
subject to local regulation, which in turn was subject to strict FCC guidelines. Id. “Cable
programming” service provided all other tiers of cable programming except pay-per-view service.
Id. The 1996 Telecommunications Act deregulated rates for cable operators providing “cable
programming” services, effective after March 31, 1999. Id. at 271. The cable industry fought for
this deregulation, in order to have cable providers offering “cable programming” services free from
FCC reasonable rate regulations. Id. However, it is ironic that in Gulf Power, the cable industry
switched sides and fought for FCC regulation. Overview, supra note 2. “While the cable industry
generally favors marketplace solutions over regulatory solutions, it believes that in the case of pole
attachments, utilities control essential facilities that cannot practicably be replicated.” Id. at 7.
108. See infra notes 111 - 122 and accompanying text (discussing broad regulation for
information technology services). See also Nancy J. Whitmore, The Evolution of the Intermediate
Scrutiny Standard and the Rise of the Bottleneck “Rule” in the Turner Decisions, 8 COMM. L. &
POLICY, 25, 44 (2003) (explaining that the Gulf Power case was not the first occasion where the
FCC asked the Court to define cable services). In Turner, the FCC urged the Court to
constitutionally classify cable television under the same First Amendment standard that applied to
broadcast television. Id. The Court declined to define cable television, but nonetheless, held that
program content on cable systems was afforded less First Amendment protection than traditional
broadcast medium, due to the monopolist characteristics of cable systems providers. Id. at 28. See
also Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622 (1994); supra note 24.
109. See infra notes 123 - 150 and accompanying text.
110. See infra notes 151 - 174 and accompanying text.
111. Weiser, supra note 45, at 11 (arguing that the classic Chevron analysis should be extended
to federal courts deferring to state agencies’ interpretations of federal law, especially in the FCC
interconnection and local access area). In the 1996 Act, Congress invited state agencies to
implement federal regulatory schemes for municipal local owned exchange carriers. Id. at 13-14.
However, the Act does not set forth the appropriate standard of review. Id. at 14. Weiser suggests
three reasons why the Chevron standard should apply to the state agencies as well: (1) the fact that
Congress delegated the rulemaking responsibility to the state agency in the first place; (2) the
institutional competence of agencies over courts in making certain types of decisions; and (3) the
superior ability of agencies to fill the gaps in complex regulatory schemes. Id. at 24-26. The notion
that state agencies’ interpretations of their own statutes, with the FCC’s guidelines as parameters,
should be given deference under Chevron is consistent with the policy behind the Court’s decision.
Id. “[A]gencies . . . are the bodies charged with developing statutory policies left implicit in a
regulatory scheme.” Id. at 25.
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example, the FCC regulates rates for pole attachments carrying services
other than the transmission of traditional telephone and cable television,
such as network attachments under 47 U.S.C. § 251.112 A “network
attachment” is the gateway to the facilities and services an information
technology company owns.113 Allowing liberal deference to complex
agency statutes is a result-oriented approach, permitting the agency to
regulate from the bottom up, rather than from the top down.114 This is a
practical attitude toward statutory interpretation, permitting common
sense and life experience to factor into the analysis.115 This pragmatic
112. 47 U.S.C. § 251(b)(4) (2000) (stating that local exchange telecommunications carriers
have “the duty to afford access to the poles, ducts, conduits, and rights-of-way of such carrier to
competing providers of telecommunications services on rates, terms and conditions that are
consistent with § 224 of this title”).
113. See Claudia Catalano, Annotation, Cable Television Equipment as Subject to Sales or Use
Tax, 2000 A.L.R. 5th 6, § 2 (2000). An example of a cable television network attachment consists
of a housing device attached to a pole for the reception, amplification, conversion and transmission
of television signals to a subscriber’s television set. Id. See also Verizon Communications, Inc. v.
F.C.C., 535 U.S. 467, 501 (2002) (holding that “the breadth and complexity of the Commission’s
responsibilities demand that it be given every reasonable opportunity to formulate methods of
regulation appropriate for the solution of its intensely practical difficulties” (citing Permian Basin,
390 U.S. at 790)). In Verizon, the FCC regulation in question involved the relationship between
monopoly local telephone companies and companies entering the local markets to compete with the
incumbents. Id. at 675. Under the 1996 Telecommunications Act, the new entrants were allowed
access to the local telephone network attachments owned by the local monopolists. Id. This
regulation was put in place to “increase competition in the persistently monopolistic local markets,
which were thought to be the root of natural monopoly in the telecommunications industry.” Id. at
475-76; New York v. F.E.R.C., 535 U.S. 1, 15-16 (2002) (holding that the Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission’s jurisdiction over the cost of transmitting unbundled electricity
“represents a statutorily permissible policy choice to which we must also defer under Chevron”).
The Court’s giving liberal deference to complex agency statutes was evident even before the
Supreme Court’s holding in Chevron. See, e.g., Federal Power Commission v. Florida Power &
Light Co., 404 U.S. 453, 463 (1972) (holding that when resolving a purely factual question within
the area of agency competence based on “engineering and scientific considerations, we recognize
the relevant agency’s technical expertise and experience, and defer to its analysis unless it is without
substantial basis in fact”). But see AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utilities Bd., 525 U.S. 366 (1999) for an
example of a Supreme Court decision that found the FCC’s pricing and nonpricing provision of 47
U.S.C. § 251(d) unreasonable under the Chevron analysis. In Iowa Utilities Bd., several rules in §
251 were challenged, and the Court upheld all of them except the pricing and nonpricing provision.
Id. at 371. It is interesting to note that in the Court’s opinion, Justice Scalia stated “[I]t would be
gross understatement to say that the 1996 Act is not a model of clarity.” Id. at 397.
114. Bradford C. Mank, Is a Textualist Approach to Statutory Interpretation ProEnvironmentalist?: Why Pragmatic Agency Decisionmaking is Better Than Judicial Literalism, 53
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1231, 1286 (1996) (arguing that judges or agencies should use a “ ‘situation
sense’ or ‘practical reason’ based on their experience and expertise to enable them to choose the
best interpretation among several competing, plausible choices in light of both Congress’ most
probable intent and the policy consequences of various plausible interpretations”).
115. Id. See Martin v. Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission, 499 U.S. 144,
151 (1991) (stating that “[b]ecause applying an agency’s regulation to complex or changing
circumstances calls upon the agency’s unique expertise and policy-making prerogatives, we
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approach means, for example, that the FCC can intend to regulate rates
for high-speed Internet access via coaxial cables without literally
labeling what commingled cable services actually are.116 Justice
Kennedy noted this approach in Gulf Power when he said that
commingled cable lines and wireless telecommunications services are
“within the heartland” of the FCC’s jurisdiction, regardless of exactly
how the agency defines those terms.117
This approach is apropos to highly complex and technical statutes
in areas such as information technology, commingled cable services and
wireless telecommunications.118 The technology behind electronic
presume that the power authoritatively to interpret its own regulations is a component of the
agency’s delegated lawmaking powers”). See also infra notes 116 - 119 and accompanying text for
an analysis of statutory interpretation theories.
116. Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, Legislative Intent and Public Choice, 74 VA. L.
REV. 423, 424-25 (1988) (stating that a more pragmatic approach to statutory construction, in which
legislative intent is prominent, supports the traditional ideas of legislative coherence). But see
M.C.I. Telecomms. Corp., v. AT&T, 512 U.S. 218 (1994) (rejecting the FCC’s interpretation of the
word “modify” in § 203(b) of the 1934 Telecommunications Act as being outside the scope of
authority Congress delegated to the agency). In M.C.I., the FCC contended that because Congress
gave it the authority to modify a rate requirement, it therefore had the authority to eliminate a rate
requirement for certain long distance carriers. Id. at 225 (emphasis added). The FCC argued that
the word “modify” meant to “make a basic or important change.” Id. at 226. The agency stated this
definition established sufficient ambiguity to defer to its interpretation that the term “modify”
encompassed an elimination of a rate requirement, under the Chevron standard. Id. at 226. The
Court disagreed with the FCC’s position, finding the agency interpretation unreasonable under
Chevron. Id. at 231. “It is highly unlikely that Congress would leave the determination of whether
an industry will be entirely, or even substantially, rate-regulated to agency discretion – and even
more unlikely that it would achieve that through such a subtle device as permission to “modify”
rate-filing requirements.” Id.
117. Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n, Inc. v. Gulf Power Co., 534 U.S. 327, 342 (2002). See
also William N. Eskridge, Jr., Statutory Interpretation as Practical Reasoning, 42 STAN. L REV.
321, 323 (1990) (arguing that the most effective rules of statutory interpretation stem from ancient
Aristotelian philosophy). Eskridge cites two interpretation theories that were inspired by Aristotle’s
line of thinking. Id. The first, modern hermeneutics, is based on the notion that a subject retrieves
meaning from an object. Id. The goal is to find common ground between interpreter and text. Id.
The second theory is traditional American pragmatism, which focuses on practical reasoning. Id.
Eskridge notes that both theories “emphasize . . . the concrete situatedness of the interpretive
enterprise, which militates against overarching theories; the complexity of interpretation and
argument, which recognizes that different values will pull the interpreter in different directions; and
the importance of workable resolutions to complex questions.” Id. at 323-24.
118. See Transmission Access Policy Study Group v. F.E.R.C., 225 F.3d 667, 714 (D.C. Cir.
2000) (stating that when the issue requires a high level of expertise, courts “must defer to the
informed discretion of the responsible federal agency”). In Transmission Access, the D.C. Circuit
held that the enormously technical and difficult task F.E.R.C. faced in deregulating the utility
companies was well recognized. Id. at 724. The court held that F.E.R.C. produced a
“comprehensive, evenhanded record . . . carefully considering all commenters’ claims,” it
accomplished its stated objectives, conformed to case law and reasonably accommodated all
competing interests. Id. The court stated that given the extremely technical nature of these issues,
as well as the highly deferential standard of review, “FERC has done an admirable job.” Id. See
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information devices changes rapidly, and Congress must be broad in
defining high-tech terms or proposed bills will be outdated before they
are passed into law.119 The general consuming public cannot even keep
up with purchasing the newest and fastest electronic devices, therefore it
is unreasonable to think that Congress or the federal agencies could keep
up with regulating them.120 Although Justice Thomas’ dissent makes

also supra note 45 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Chevron analysis as it relates to
highly complex and technical statutes.
119. See Kate Marquess, Technical Difficulties: Litigating Computer-Related Cases Means
Bringing the Judge and Jury up to Speed on the Complexities of a Fast-Paced Industry. Find Out
How to Avoid Being Left in the Dot.com Dust, 87 JAN A.B.A. J. 54, 57 (2001) (explaining that
keeping up with changes in both technology and pertinent areas of the law can be exhausting, as
evidenced by the recent Napster copyright case and Microsoft antitrust case). “That means judges
and lawyers need to keep up with minute-by-minute changes. They also need to think about
applying old rules to a new game.” Id. See also Jason H. Marcus, Don’t Stop That Funky Beat: The
Essentiality of Digital Sampling to Rap Music, 13 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L. J. 767, 778 (1991)
(noting the inability of the legislature to predict future advancements in The Copyright Act, and
how this leads to disputes and questions about the applicability of the Act to novel situations).
Marcus explained that strict construction is inappropriate when analyzing statutes governing areas
with potential technological advancements. Id. at 779. Going back to 1968, the Supreme Court
recognized this concept in Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists Television, a case involving
transmitting cable television to rural West Virginia. Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists Television,
392 U.S. 390, 395-96 (1968).
Our inquiry cannot be limited to ordinary meaning and legislative history, for this is a
statute that was drafted long before the development of the electronic phenomena with
which we deal here. In 1909 radio itself was in its infancy, and television had not been
invented. We must read the statutory language of 60 years ago in light of drastic
technological change.
Id. Marc Andreessen, The New IT crisis, SPECIAL TO ZDNET FROM ZDWIRE, available at 2002 WL
7064728 (Dec. 11, 2002) (stating that the most “thankless, cumbersome function faced by Fortune
2000 companies” today is keeping up with the state of information technology). The average large
business spends seven to eight percent of its revenue on information technology, with
approximately seventy percent of this budget going toward the management of new devices. Id.
“After spending the past decade helping everyone else inside the company hop aboard the
technology bandwagon, it is time for IT to jump on as well.” Id.; Sonya A. Donaldson, Cyberwise:
Keeping Up, BLACK ENTERPRISE, Oct. 1, 2002, at 68, available at LEXIS, Nexis Library, BLKENT
file (stating that when it comes to technology, it does not make sense to purchase the “latest” just
because it is new; “[d]oing so is a surefire way of quickly . . . going broke”).
120. Donaldson, supra note 119, at 68. See also Lara J. Glasgow & Alicia N. Vaz, Symposium
Beyond Microsoft: Antitrust, Technology, and Intellectual Property, 16 BERKELEY TECH. L. J. 525
(2001) (stating that there are potential complications that arise when applying long established law
to the rapidly changing universe of technology). Glasgow & Vaz explain that the dynamic nature of
high technology makes it difficult for any one company or any one product to dominate a particular
market share. Id. at 527. This unpredictability affects areas of the law such as antitrust, intellectual
property and communications law, because it is hard to determine whether government bodies are
equipped to handle the changing economic demands. Id. Glasgow and Vaz specifically reference
the administrative concerns regarding the speed of the Federal Trade Commission’s review process
in comparison to the speed of the fast-paced world of high technology. Id. “[T]he harm to
consumers might be irreversible by the time a sufficient factual inquiry can even begin.” Id. at 528.
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logical sense point by point,121 it will not work to accomplish the
legislative goals behind the 1996 Act in the most effective and efficient
way.122
B. Anti-Monopoly Considerations
The purpose behind the 1978 Pole Attachments Act is to protect
emerging cable companies from unreasonably high rental rates by poleowning utility companies.123 At the time the statute was enacted, cable
companies and utility companies were not direct competitors because
they each provided their own unique services.124 However, less than
twenty years later the information technology revolution had arrived and
the regulatory landscape needed change.125 The 1996 Amendments to
the Act lifted some restrictions placed on utility companies that
prohibited them from diversifying into telecommunications services.126
121. See Gulf Power, 534 U.S. at 347-61 (Thomas, J. dissenting). Justice Thomas’ dissent
focuses on the traditional “plain meaning rule” of statutory interpretation. Id. According to
Eskridge, supra note 117, at 340, the plain meaning rule is that “[t]he beginning, and usually the
end, of statutory interpretation should be the apparent meaning of the statutory language.” Id. This
theory is also referred to as “texutalism,” and is supported by the rule-of-law, in that one should be
able to read a statute and therefore know their rights and duties. Id. at 340. Oliver Wendell Holmes
wrote, somewhat sarcastically, “[w]e do not inquire what the legislature meant; we ask only what
the statute means.” Id. (citing Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Theory of Legal Interpretation, 12
HARV. L. REV. 417, 419 (1899)); see also Farber & Frickey, supra note 116, who argue that:
several prominent judges appointed by President Reagan . . . most notably Justice
Antonin Scalia, have advocated a radical reassessment of the concept of legislative
intent. They would reject, or at least sharply limit, reliance on legislative history, and
they would abandon any consideration of congressional actions or statements after a
statute was passed. Justice Scalia . . . would go further and jettison the whole idea of
legislative intent as a guide to interpretation.
Id. at 423.
122. The Telecommunications Act of 1996 was designed “to provide for a pro-competitive, deregulatory national policy framework designed to accelerate rapidly private sector deployment of
advanced telecommunications and information technologies and services to all Americans by
opening all telecommunications markets to competition.” S. Rep. No. 104-230, at 1.
123. See supra notes 21 - 22 and accompanying text for a discussion of the policy behind the
1996 Act.
124. See Frank W. Lloyd, Telephone Company Entry Into Video Programming, in CABLE
TELEVISION LAW 1992: CABLE FACES CONGRESS, THE COURTS, AND COMPETITION, at 757, 802
(PLI PATENTS, COPYRIGHTS, TRADEMARKS, AND LITERARY PROPERTY, Course Handbook Series
No. G4-3877, Feb.-Apr. 1992) available at WL 330 PLI/PAT 757 (explaining that Congress enacted
the 1978 Pole Attachment Act because the utility companies had a superior bargaining position over
the cable operators, who needed the right to lease pole space). Lloyd notes that Congress was aware
that cable and utility companies may be potential competitors in the future provision of nonvideo
services, but in 1978, this idea was only speculative. Id. at 804.
125. Id.
126. Brief of Petitioner at 10, Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n, Inc. v. Gulf Power Co., 534
U.S. 327 (2002) (No. 00-832). Petitioners argue that the 1996 Telecommunications Act was a pro-
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Today, utility companies can compete directly against cable companies
and other telecommunications providers for the same information
technology market share. 127
The 1996 Amendments also expanded the protection of § 224,128
and broadened the access to bottleneck facilities129 necessary for greater
competition in the arena of communications and information technology
services.130 Under Gulf Power, less emphasis is placed on what type of
service is being provided, and more emphasis is placed on what type of
company is doing the providing.131 If the Gulf Power Court had
determined that the FCC was acting outside their jurisdiction by
including additional attachments within the ambit of § 224, the result
would have had a huge economic impact on the information technology
industry.132 Companies that provided services other than “solely cable”
competitive effort to restructure the telecommunications and information technology fields. Id.
Pole owning utility companies now had a greater incentive to deny access to their poles on
“reasonable rates, terms and conditions,” because the utility companies were allowed to compete
with cable companies for attachment space on poles that they owned. Id. See also Chen, supra note
21, at 693 (stating that cable companies owned few poles of their own, and therefore relied on the
utility companies’ poles, as bottleneck facilities, to house their cable attachments).
127. Brief of Petitioner at 10-11, Gulf Power, (No. 00-832). See also Kathryn A. Tongue,
Municipal Entry into the Broadband Cable Market: Recognizing the Inequities in Allowing Publicly
Owned Cable Systems to Compete Directly Against Private Providers, 95 N.W. U. L. REV. 1099,
1115-16 (2001) (arguing that privately owned cable companies are at a disadvantage against
municipal utility companies that are trying to break into the cable market). “[M]unicipal cable
systems use monopoly rates from one service, such as water or gas, to subsidize broadband cable
services in competition against private cable companies.” Id. at 1116. Tongue also notes that a
second unfair advantage the municipal utility companies enjoy over private cable companies is that
tax laws often exempt municipalities from their coverage. Id. Tax laws favor municipally owned
companies in other ways as well. Id. at 1116. The recent deregulation of the electric industry is one
example that is analogous to the cable service provider situation at issue in Gulf Power. Id.
Although private companies are free to provide electric service to consumers, they may not be able
to compete with the municipally owned electric companies, who are exempt from certain taxes. Id.
at 1117. “This debate stems from the fear that tax preferences for municipal electric utilities will
distort competition and create a lopsided playing field in the newly competitive electric industry.”
Id.
128. See Barbara S. Esbin & Gary S. Lutzker, Poles, Holes and Cable Open Access: Where the
Global Information Superhighway Meets the Local Right-of-Way, 10 COMM. LAW CONSPECTUS 23,
24 (2001) (explaining that expanding the regulatory scheme was not an easy task, because the new
capabilities rarely fit nicely into existing regulatory categories). “[I]t presents daunting challenges
to those charged with administering a regulatory framework premised upon distinct networks,
services and service providers.” Id.
129. See supra note 62 for an explanation of a bottleneck facility.
130. Esbin & Lutzker, supra note 128, at 31.
131. Id. at 29.
132. Overview, supra note 2 (noting that the cable industry is “concerned that an adverse
decision would seriously undermine the 1996 Telecommunications Act’s twin goals of creating a
competitive communications environment, free of bottlenecks, and promoting the continued
deployment and availability of affordable high-speed Internet service to all Americans”). The
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would not be able to secure protection under the FCC’s regulatory
umbrella.133 Utility companies, who have a monopoly134 on utility poles,
would have been able to charge unreasonable rates for the dissemination
of technically innovative services to the consuming public.135
National Cable and Telecommunications Association predicted that without regulation, the utility
companies’ average rate increase would raise the cable companies’ cost of providing “traditional
cable, digital video services, and high-speed Internet access from a few pennies a month to over
$1.00 per month for each cable customer” in several North Dakota towns. Id. at 6. See cf. 73B
C.J.S. Public Utilities § 34 (explaining that regulating agencies have the responsibility of balancing
the right of the utility’s investors against the right of the public that it pay no more than a reasonable
value for the utility’s service). If the two rights cannot be compatibly balanced, it is the consuming
public that must prevail. Id.
133. This would clearly go against congressional intent to delegate to the FCC broad authority.
See Michael A. DiSabatino, Annotation, Who is a “Common Carrier” of “Carrier” Within the
Meaning of § 3(H) of the Commuications Act of 1934 (47 U.S.C.A. §153(H)), 46 A.L.R. FED. 626, §
2b (1980) (noting that, going back to 1968, the Supreme Court has repeatedly stated that nothing in
the Telecommunications Act’s history or purpose limited the FCC’s jurisdiction to forms of
communications specifically described elsewhere in the Act) (citing United States v. Southwestern
Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157 (1968)). “Rather, the [C]ourt said, the Act confers regulatory authority
over all interstate communication by wire or radio.” Id.
134. See United States v. E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 391 (1956) (defining
monopolization as “the power to control prices or exclude competition” in a relevant market, plus a
general willful intent to acquire, use, or preserve that power). But see TV Signal Co. of Aberdeen v.
AT&T, 462 F.2d 1256, 1259 (8th Cir. 1972) (holding that a pole attachment agreement between a
telephone company and a cable television company was not subject to the Robinson-Patman Act, 15
U.S.C. § 13(a) (2000), which forbids price discrimination “between different purchasers of
commodities of like grade and quality”). The court held that “space on a telephone pole was not a
commodity within the purview of the Act.” Id. The court explained that a pole attachment was
more akin to a real estate transaction. Id. This 1972 case was decided well before the 1978 Pole
Attachments Act, and before the courts knew what the face of the cable and information technology
industries would look like today. Id. The Eighth Circuit has since changed their view on whether
pole attachments could be the subject of a monopoly. See TV Signal Co. of Aberdeen v. AT&T,
617 F.2d 1302, 1307-09 (8th Cir. 1980) (holding that cable companies and telephone utility
companies are actual competitors in the construction of cable systems, and potential competitors in
broadband telecommunications services). In the 1980 case, the Eighth Circuit held that the utility
company’s policy of one attachment per pole illegally abused the utility’s monopoly and involved
an illegal conspiracy to raise the cable service provider’s entry cost in violation of the Sherman
Antitrust Act §§ 1 & 2. Id.
135. Gulf Power Co. v. FCC, 208 F.3d 1263, 1271 (11th Cir. 2000). The utility companies
involved in the Gulf Power case put forth another argument against FCC regulation of pole
attachment rates for services other than “solely cable.” Id. The utilities argued that the
implementation of the FCC’s formula for computing attachment rents amounted to a taking without
just compensation under the Fifth Amendment. Id. The Supreme Court ruled on a similar issue in a
1987 case that dealt with attachments only for cable television, before high-speed Internet access via
commingled coaxial cables was an issue. FCC v. Florida Power Corp., 480 U.S. 245, 248-49
(1987). In that case, the Court held that no taking occurred because Florida Power Corp. had
voluntarily agreed to the cable companies’ attachments. Id. Nonetheless, the Gulf Power
respondents put forth the same takings clause argument again, in the hopes that the court of appeals
would rule differently for attachment rates for services other than “solely cable.” Gulf Power, 208
F.3d at 1271. The district court granted summary judgment to the FCC, citing the Supreme Court’s
Florida Power decision. Gulf Power Co. v. United States, 998 F.Supp. 1386, 1395 (N.D. Fla.
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Today’s Internet users are concerned with the end product,
primarily desiring faster and more advanced Internet access and web
technologies.136 It is highly unlikely that Internet users care whether or
not their Internet service provider is a cable company, a
telecommunications company or an independent provider.137 Allowing a
monopoly clearly goes against the underlying goals and policies of
Congress’ delegation of power in authorizing FCC regulation of pole
attachments.138
There are other examples of the FCC fostering competition by
reducing the restraints imposed through government granted
monopolies.139 One such example is that, under the 1996 Act,
1998).
136. See Kelley, supra note 2, at 2141 (stating that the average Internet user may not know
exactly how they are connected to the Internet, or even what the Internet is). See also Howard A.
Shelanski, Symposium: The Speed Gap: Broadband Infrastructure and Electronic Commerce, 14
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 721, 722 (1999) (stating that “[t]he faster and less expensive the links are
between users and the Internet, the more quickly electronic commerce is likely to grow”); Julian
Epstein, A Lite Touch on Broadband: Achieving the Optimal Regulatory Efficiency in the Internet
Broadband Market, 38 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 37, 41(2000) (explaining that downloading the movie
Titanic using a traditional dial up Internet connection takes over forty-two hours, while the task can
be accomplished over a high-speed, or broadband, Internet connection in less than nine minutes);
Marc S. Berger, Keeping Pace with the Expanding Internet: Can the Courts Keep Up?, 9 ALB. L. J.
SCI. & TECH. 51, 66 (1998) (stating that cable modems, and other high-speed Internet access
devices, allow users to download information at speeds up to 1,000 times faster than traditional
modems). “The increased transmission rates provide users with a new array of digital services and
interactivity including limitless ‘channels,’ video on demand, cleaner pictures and better sound
quality.” Id. at 66-67.
137. Id. See also Meyerson, supra note 101, at 288 (stating that amidst all the technology
convergence, one thought should be kept in mind, that “[a]t the end of the day, what will be most
important for the American citizen is not the quantity of fiber optics, coaxial cable or microwave
antennae that line our streets, but the quality of the information that enters our businesses and
homes”).
138. See supra notes 21 - 22 and accompanying text for a discussion of the policy behind the
1996 Act.
139. As a general rule, a government may not create or grant a monopoly. See U.S. CONST.
amend. XIV, § 1 (stating that “[n]o State shall make or enforce any law which shall . . . deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws). However, this rule has a limiting
effect in two substantial areas. Marla K. Clark, Monopolies and Combinations in Restraint of
Trade, 20 IND. LAW ENCYCL., Monopolies and Unfair Trade §§ 1-3 (2002). First, the Equal
Protection clause does not apply to things that are by their nature monopolies. Id. Second, the rule
does not apply “to prevent a municipality from granting an exclusive franchise where a question of
the public health or safety is concerned.” Id. An example of a constitutional government grant of
monopoly power is “[a] franchise granted by a municipality authorizing one to construct and
maintain telephone lines in the street for a specified period, [and] has been held not to be invalid as
a monopoly in the absence of words expressly stating the grant to be exclusive.” 58 C.J.S.
Monopolies § 15 (2002). See also Michael Conant, Antimonopoly Tradition Under the Ninth and
Fourteenth Amendments: Slaughter-House Cases Re-examined, 31 EMORY L.J. 785, 785 (1982)
(discussing that government grants of monopoly for ordinarily competitive goods and services are
widespread). These grants of monopoly power are usually formed as congressional exemptions
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incumbent local exchange carriers (LECs)140 were required to share their
network elements with competitors,141 and local franchising authorities
were limited in their ability to restrict local competition.142 A glaring
from antitrust laws, resulting in “government-sponsored cartels.” Id. In Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S.
341, 362 (1943), which concerned state enforced pricing of California raisins, the Supreme Court
held that state sponsorship of cartels immunizes cartel members from the antitrust laws if the cartel
pricing policy is clearly articulated by state law and active state supervision is found to exist.
Conant, supra, at 362 (citing Parker).
140. A local exchange carrier is “any person that is engaged in the provision of telephone
exchange service or exchange access.” 47 U.S.C. § 153 (26) (2000).
141. See 47 U.S.C. § 153(29) (2000), which defines a network element as:
a facility or equipment used in the provision of a telecommunications service. Such
terms also includes features, functions, and capabilities that are provided by means of
such facility or equipment, including subscriber numbers, databases, signaling systems,
and information sufficient for billing and collection or used in the transmission, routing,
or other provision of a telecommunications service.
Id. See also 47 U.S.C. § 251(c)(2)-(4) (2000) (imposing three specific requirements on the
incumbent LECs to foster competition). Section 251(c)(2) requires the LECs to allow local
competitors to interconnect with the existing local exchange networks at fair, nondiscriminatory
rates. Id. Section 251(c)(3) requires the LECs to allow local competitors to lease parts of existing
local exchange networks at fair, nondiscriminatory rates. Id. Finally, section 251(c)(4) requires the
LECs to allow local competitors to purchase telephone services at wholesale rates for resale to the
competitors’ customers. Id. Section 251(c)(3), requiring nondiscriminatory leasing of “parts” of
existing networks, refers to “unbundled” network elements. See 47 U.S.C. § 153(29) (2002)
(defining an unbundled network element as “a single network element that a competitor may lease
on its own, or if the competitor wishes, in combination with other elements”). This FCC-mandated
deterioration of local telephone companies’ monopolies sparked a surge of litigation in the late
1990’s, as LECs across the nation challenged both the FCC’s rulemaking authority, and, in the
alternative, the reasonableness of the FCC’s newly proposed rules. See, e.g., Melcher v. F.C.C., 134
F.3d 1143, 1164 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (upholding FCC regulations to prohibit LECs from holding local
multipoint distribution service licenses in the same geographic areas which they provided telephone
service as “not only rational, but highly sound”); City of Dallas, Tex. v. F.C.C., 165 F.3d 341, 352
(5th Cir. 1999) (holding that the FCC did not exceed its authority in adopting regulations permitting
non-LECs to be certified as open video system operators); AT&T Communications of Virginia, Inc.
v. Bell Atlantic-Virginia, Inc., 197 F.3d 663, 670 (4th Cir. 1999) (holding that the FCC regulations
plainly required Bell Atlantic to allow AT&T and MCI to use their network equipment for
switching and routing); MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. Michigan Bell Telephone Co., 79 F. Supp.2d
768, 792 (6th Cir. 1999) (holding that LECs shall provide access to directory listings to competing
providers, and that the competing providers must be able to read the information in the LECs
directory assistance databases).
142. See AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utilities Bd., 525 U.S. 366, 371 (1999) (explaining that the 1996
Telecommunications Act fundamentally restructured local telephone markets by ending the state
granted LEC monopolies). In that case, the LECs argued that primary authority to implement the
local competition provisions of the Act belonged to the states rather than the FCC. Id. at 374. The
Eighth Circuit agreed with the telephone companies, and vacated the FCC’s pricing rules as
reaching beyond the Commission’s jurisdiction. Id. (citing Iowa Utilities Board v. FCC, 120 F.3d
753, 805-06 (1997)). The court of appeals reasoned that nothing in the 1996 Act overcame the
presumption in the 1934 Act of preserving state authority over intrastate communications. Iowa
Utilities, 120 F.3d at 796. According to the court of appeals, this presumption is a fence that is “hog
tight, horse high, and bull strong, preventing the FCC from intruding on the states’ intrastate turf.”
Id. at 800. The Supreme Court reversed the decision and upheld the FCC regulations. AT&T Corp.,
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exception to the anti-monopoly approach was that monopoly state and
municipally owned telephone franchises were exempted from federal
regulation.143 Congress left the locally owned telephone companies
under state regulation, and this meant that in many communities,
consumers had no choice of carriers for their local telephone service.144
525 U.S. at 397. Justice Scalia used his signature style of interpreting statutes according to their
plain meaning, by stating “[w]e think that the grant in § 201(b) means what it says: The FCC has
rulemaking authority to carry out the ‘provisions’ of this Act” Id. at 378. See supra note 121 and
accompanying text for a discussion of Justice Scalia and the plain meaning rule. See also Verizon
Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 535 U.S. 467 (2002) (holding that the FCC is authorized to “require
state utility commissions to set the rates charged by the incumbents for leased elements on a
forward-looking basis untied to the incumbents’ investment”).
143. See Paul Glist, Wesley R. Heppler & T. Scott Thompson, Telecommunications
“Franchising,” in CABLE TELEVISION LAW 2001: COMPETITION IN VIDEO, INTERNET &
TELEPHONY at 349, 381-382 (PLI PATENTS, COPYRIGHTS, TRADEMARKS, AND LITERARY
PROPERTY, Course Handbook Series No. G0-00LY, Mar.-Apr. 2001), available at WL 642 PLI/PAT
349 (explaining that local telephone service is of a “state concern,” and the state has retained the
broader police power of granting the franchises). However, this leaves the power to grant franchises
to the state or municipal governments. See 47 U.S.C. § 253 (2000) (stating that local
telecommunications franchising issues have been preserved to local authority). Thus, although
competitive local exchange carriers (CLECs) are now allowed to enter the market, the CLECs must
lease the network equipment from, and pay reasonable compensation for, use of rights-of-way to,
the incumbent LECs. Nicholas P. Miller, Joseph Van Eaton, William L. Lowery, Mitsuko R.
Herrera & James R. Hobson, Municipalities and Communications Networks: Some Key Issues, in
CABLE TELEVISION LAW 2001: COMPETITION IN VIDEO, INTERNET & TELEPHONY at 279, 289-90
(PLI PATENTS, COPYRIGHTS, TRADEMARKS, AND LITERARY PROPERTY, Course Handbook Series
No. G0-00LY, Mar.-Apr. 2001), available at WL 642 PLI/PAT 279. The incumbent LECs argue
that the preservation of their rights under state law allows them to use what they already own
without paying compensation. Id. at 289. On the other hand, the CLECs are arguing that they are
entitled to the same treatment as the incumbent providers. Id. “The claims of newcomers in turn
often depend on whether a court believes that it is necessary to extend to others whatever benefits
may have been granted a century ago to the incumbent.” Id. See, e.g., TCG Detroit v. City of
Dearborn, 16 F. Supp. 2d 785, 795-97 (E.D. Mich. 1998) (holding that, under state law, TCG (a
CLEC) could be required to obtain a franchise and pay a four percent fee, even though Ameritech
Michigan had a grandfathered franchise under Michigan state law to provide telephone service). In
that case, both state and federal claims were put forth by TCG. Id. The federal claim focused on 47
U.S.C. § 251(c) that allows municipalities to charge franchise fees, as long as the compensation is
just and reasonable. Id. at 790. The four percent franchise fee was upheld under the 1996 Act. Id.
at 791.
144. See Miller, supra note 142, at 285 for a discussion of the incumbent LEC’s arguments.
See also Jeffrey Walker, Missed Connections: One Failed Attempt to Ease Restrictions on Bell
Operating Companies, 47 FED. COMM. L.J. 439, 442 (1994) (explaining that the federal
deregulation of the long distance telephone companies actually granted a monopoly over the local
service areas to the LECs, provided they have equal access to all telephone service carriers);
Michael T. Osborne, The Unfinished Business of Breaking up “Ma Bell:” Implementing Local
Telephone Corporation in the Twenty-first Century, 7 RICH. J. L. & TECH. 4 (2000), available at
http://www.richmond.edu/jolt/v7i/note1.html (last visited March 15, 2003) (arguing that the FCC’s
most important role after enacting the 1996 Telecommunications Act was to facilitate “a swift
transition form the ‘bad old days’ of monopoly provision of local telephone service to a new era of
fully competitive and deregulated local telecommunications markets”). Osborne argued that the
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It is possible that the Gulf Power decision is a precursor to allowing
the FCC to regulate, and possibly dissect, the local access telephone
monopolies.145 By dismantling state granted local telephone franchise
monopolies, the FCC would finally be able to “offer regulatory certainty
for communications providers at the federal, state, and local levels.”146
Today, “communications providers” is a general term for companies that
provide information services, such as traditional telephone companies,
cable companies and Internet service providers.147 In Gulf Power the
FCC has not reached its goal of a fully deregulated local market. Id. Quoting Winston Churhill’s
memorable line, Osborne concluded that “this is not the beginning of the end – it is the end of the
beginning.” Id.
145. Meyerson, supra note 101, at 255-56. Under federal law, states are limited to
telecommunications rate regulations that are just and reasonable, and states and municipalities retain
their ability to manage the public rights-of-way. Id. See also 86 C.J.S. Telecommunications § 205
Pole Attachments (August 2002) (explaining that under the Federal Communications Act, the rates,
terms and conditions of pole attachments, meaning attachments by a cable television system or
provider of telecommunications services to a utility’s pole, duct, conduit, or right-of-way, are
regulated by the FCC, unless a state meets certain requirements). Cf. Esbin & Lutzker, supra note
128, at 69 (suggesting that the Gulf Power decision may have direct legal bearing on the authority
of municipalities to impose open access as a cable franchising requirement). Esbin & Lutzker
critique the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit’s holding, and predict that the Supreme Court
will reverse. Id. at 70. “The Eleventh Circuit’s Gulf Power II decision exemplifies how courts can
be led astray by a combination of silence from the expert agency charged with interpreting federal
law and an analysis that reads the relevant statute in a vacuum divorced from its underlying
policies.” Id.
146. Arthur H. Harding & Paul W. Jamieson, Dismantling the Final Regulatory Entry
Barriers: A Call for the FCC to Assert its Preemptive Authority, 12 HARV. J. L. & TECH. 533, 535
(2000). The FCC has authority to preempt state and local regulations that conflict with the 1996
Telecommunications Act’s provisions and policies. Id. Even when localities’ regulations violate
the letter and intent of the 1996 Act by deterring CLECs from entering the local telephone market,
the FCC has responded timidly and slowly. Id. at 540. This is “evidenced by the lack of vibrant
competition in areas such as local residential telephony.” Id. at 537. The major obstacle to
achieving Congress’ goal of speedy deployment of information technology is the patchwork of local
telephone regulations. Id at 556-57.
147. See infra note 148 and accompanying text for examples of the convergence of information
services technologies. The theory behind regulation of converging technologies is that if
technology “A” offers the same service as technology “B,” the two technologies should be regulated
as competitors even though they may be technically different. Benjamin Lipschitz, Regulatory
Treatment of Network Convergence: Opportunities and Challenges in the Digital Era, 7 MEDIA L.
& POL’Y 14, 16 (1998).
Factors such as technological innovation, changes in the market, and developments in
regulatory reform are all serving to create an entirely new, overlapping marketplace for
basic services such as telecommunications, electric, gas, etc. These factors have further
propelled companies to enter into strategic alliances, joint ventures, and in some cases,
mergers, which enables them to offer a menu of product options to consumers and to
operate their systems more efficiently. This is commonly referred to as ‘convergence.’
Id. (quoting Consumer Energy Council of America Research Foundation Convergence Forum,
Case Study: Regulatory Convergence, available at http://www.cecarf.org/projects/convergence/csregulatory.html). See also Senator Ted Stevens, The Internet and the Telecommunications Act of
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Court acknowledged that these traditionally separate industries will
continue to merge into one entity, generally referred to as information
technology service providers.148
In light of this envisioned merger, the Court decided to read the
Pole Attachments Act broadly and allow FCC regulation of wireless
telecommunication, and commingled cable and high-speed Internet
access attachments, two terms that are not literally defined in the Act.149
It is this type of practical, aggressive enforcement that the FCC needs to
assert, and the courts need to uphold, in order to foster competition in
this highly technical arena.150
1996, 35 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 5, 6 (1998) (opining that Congress designed the 1996
Telecommunications Act to apply to existing technologies as well as future technologies such as the
Internet and other hybrid services). Senator Stevens noted that Congress added new definitions
such as “information service” to the 1996 Act in response to the convergence of communications
and computer technology. Id. at 11; Robert M. Frieden, Universal Service: When Technologies
Converge and Regulatory Models Diverge, 13 HARV. J. LAW & TECH. 395, 396 (2000) (discussing
that cable modems, wideband satellite and terrestrial broadband services, asymmetric digital
subscriber links, and other technologies that provide high-speed Internet access have “triggered the
transition from Plain Old Telephone Service (‘POTS’) to Pretty Amazing New Stuff (‘PANS’)”).
148. Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n, Inc. v. Gulf Power Co., 534 U.S. 327, 333 (2002)
(holding that “if one day [a cable television company’s] cable provides high-speed Internet access,
in addition to cable television service, the cable does not cease, at that instant, to be an attachment
‘by a cable television system’”). See also John F. Gibbs & Todd G. Hartman, Telecommunications
in the 21st Century: The Regulation of Convergence Technologies: An Argument for
Technologically Sensitive Regulation, 27 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 2193, 2193 (2001) (stating that
“[a]t nearly every level of telecommunications regulation, heated battles are being conducted over
the question of how to regulate convergence technologies”). In every court case considering the
issue of convergence technology, an analysis of the service provided by the cable or Internet
company, and whether that function was a cable service, a telecommunications service or an
information service, has been held relevant. Id. at 2196.
149. Gulf Power, 534 U.S. at 339. See also Whitmore, supra note 108, at 25 (stating that “the
law is a function of the analogies used, definitions applied and assumptions employed by those who
have participated and prevailed in the adjudication process”).
150. Harding & Jamieson, supra note 146, at 557 (concluding that the FCC should promulgate
a clear statement of principles regarding regulatory parameters, with no variation in the regulations
applied to services offered via different technologies, in order to allow free competition); see also
Henry E. Crawford, Internet Calling: FCC Jurisdiction Over Internet Telephony, 5 COMMLAW
CONSPECTUS 43, 43 (1997) (arguing that despite the fact that Internet and telephone service differ
significantly in their technology, architecture and quality, the FCC should regulate the two
industries as one). But see Andrew Kowalewski, Placing a Ban On Police Radar Jammers, Rocky
Mountain Radar v. FCC, 158 F.3d 1118 (10th Cir. 1998), 19 TEMP. ENVTL. L. & TECH. J. 137, 137
(2000) (arguing that the FCC went too far when it issued an order banning the sale and marketing of
the Spirit II, a device designed to cause police radar guns to malfunction). The Spirit II is an active
device that “emits a radio signal designed to counter and confuse the signal coming from the police
radar gun.” Id. at 137-38. Due to Spirit II’s active nature, the FCC read its regulations to bring the
device within the agency’s jurisdiction. Id. at 138. Rocky Mountain Radar, the company that
manufactures the Spirit II, challenged the FCC’s jurisdiction in Rocky Mountain Radar, Inc. v.
FCC, 158 F.3d 1118 (10th Cir. 1998). Kowalewski, supra, at 134. The Court of Appeals for the
Tenth Circuit found that the Spirit II was a radio communication under the 1996 Act, and upheld the
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C. Cable Companies Test the Waters
As society becomes ever more dependent on new technology, cable
companies will inevitably increase their entry into the
telecommunications and information services markets.151 However,
entering this market requires a large capital investment.152 From an
economic standpoint, the cable companies may have used the decision in
Gulf Power for more than just enforcing their right to regulated rates for
pole attachments.153 Because the utility companies’ poles are bottleneck
facilities,154 it made sense for the cable companies to “test the waters” to
FCC’s order to ban the device. Id. at 139.
151. Lloyd, supra note 7, at 233 (explaining that as industry and technology develop, the
division between cable television and telephone services will disappear). See also Heather T.
Hendrickson, Cable Open Access: The FCC Should Establish a National Policy of Staying Out of
the Way of Broadband Competition, 8 GEO. MASON L. REV. 749, 750 (2000) (explaining that due to
the high demand for advanced, high-speed telecommunications capability, various types of
communications companies are investing large dollars in competing technologies, including cable,
digital subscriber lines (DSL), wireless and satellite access). But see James B. Speta, Symposium
Overview: Part II: Unbundling and Open Access Policies: The Vertical Dimension of Cable Open
Access, 71 U. COLO. L. REV. 975, 975 (2000) (arguing that open access advocates contend that
cable companies entry into the Internet market is actually anti-competitive because customers have
to pay an ISP for Internet services and a cable company for online access). Internet access over
commingled cable wires will soon be a substitute for traditional cable programming. Id. at 977.
Given that, there is a fear that cable companies will provide “less than true open access in order to
protect their traditional programming revenues.” Id.
152. Hendrickson, supra note 151, at 755.
153. Id. at 751 (arguing that how heavy handed the FCC will be in regulating the Internet
access market is still unknown). Hendrickson published her Comment before the Supreme Court
handed down the Gulf Power decision. She concluded that the FCC should affirmatively choose not
to regulate the high-speed Internet access market “in its infancy,” thereby allowing the market to
regulate itself. Id. The FCC would step in if and when they saw a problem with potential
monopolies. Id. The FCC’s regulation of pole attachments for commingled cable high-speed
Internet access in Gulf Power may have been just the entry the federal agency was looking for. Pole
attachments are just one small part of the debate over how the FCC should regulate information
technology services. Now that the FCC has authority to regulate pole attachments for commingled
cable high-speed Internet access, market competitors could use the Gulf Power decision to predict
that the FCC will also impose regulations for things such as franchise fees and public rights-of-way
for incumbent wire owners. See id. at 784. “The FCC’s historical ‘unregulation’ of data services
has allowed the Internet to flourish at an amazing rate and so [the FCC] should continue the
deregulatory approach.” Id. To support her conclusion that it is too early for the FCC to regulate
Internet services, Hendrickson notes that as of spring of 2000 when her Comment was published,
the FCC had not yet statutorily classified cable broadband services as either “telecommunications
services” or “cable services” Id. at 762. When Gulf Power was handed down in January 2002, the
FCC had still not defined “an attachment by a cable television service provider.” Nat’l Cable &
Telecomms. Ass’n, Inc. v. Gulf Power Co., 534 U.S. 327, 337-39 (2002). However, the Court
based the FCC’s jurisdiction to regulate these attachments on § 224(b)(1) of the Pole Attachments
Act, authorizing the FCC to regulate any attachments, as long as the rates are “just and reasonable.”
Id. See supra note 33 and accompanying text for a thorough discussion of § 224(b)(1).
154. See supra note 62 and accompanying text for a discussion of “bottleneck facilities.”
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find out if they were also entitled to regulated rates for providing
Internet services.155
It is infeasible for cable companies to run their own lines in
duplication of the essential facilities156 infrastructure of the utility
companies’ poles and wires, due to high costs and physical space
limitations.157 However, if the cable companies did decide to duplicate,
155. See Nicole M. Payne, Note, AT&T v. City of Portland – A Decision Without a Resolution:
The Ongoing Debate Over Open Access to Broadband Internet Technology, 37 WILLAMETTE L.
REV. 717, 717-22 (2001) (arguing that the “open access” debate is the most important issue facing
cable companies today). In addition to the cable companies’ entitlement to regulated rates for pole
attachments for Internet service, FCC regulation of another area of concern in information
technology services may be looming over the cable industry. Id. The open access debate concerns
conventional Internet Service Providers (ISPs), such as America Online (AOL), wanting the right to
access cable company facilities. Id. at 719. A cable company has the necessary resources to
facilitate high-speed Internet access, but currently they can pick and choose which ISPs will have
access to their cable modem platforms. Id. at 719-20. Proponents of open access say that because
this area is currently unregulated, consumers are denied the right to a competitive market. Id. If
consumers choose to use cable modem to access the Internet, they must pay for the cable company’s
ISP. Id. Whether the FCC will require open access, or even regulate competitive conduct in a
constantly changing, highly technical arena such as high-speed Internet access, is of the utmost
importance to both the cable industry and cable modem consumers. See John E. Lopatka & William
H. Page, Internet Regulation and Consumer Welfare: Innovation, Speculation, and Cable Bundling,
52 HASTINGS L. J. 891, 894 (2001). The courts have just recently begun to address this issue. In
AT&T Corp. v. Portland, the Ninth Circuit concluded that cable modem service is not a cable
service under the 1996 Act, but a telecommunications service. AT&T Corp. v. Portland, 216 F.3d
871, 877-78 (9th Cir. 2000). This decision allowed FCC regulation of cable modem services to fall
under the telecommunications regulatory scheme, rather than the cable industry regulatory scheme,
and the court held that the 1996 Telecommunications Act prohibited the open access provision in
question. Id. However, in Gulf Power, the Supreme Court declined to follow the Ninth Circuit’s
lead, and ruled that it was unclear whether the FCC defined cable modem service as a
telecommunications server or as a cable service. See supra notes 79 – 82 (discussing the Court’s
reasoning). In Gulf Power, the issue of open access was not before the Court. See also MediaOne
Group, Inc. v. County of Henrico, 97 F. Supp.2d 712, 716-17 (E.D. Va. 2000) (holding the open
access ordinance invalid under the 1996 Act); Comcast Cablevision of Broward County, Inc. v.
Broward County, 124 F. Supp.2d 685, 698 (S.D. Fla. 2000) (holding the open access ordinance
invalid under the First Amendment).
156. See Lloyd, supra note 7, at 255. The antitrust essential facilities doctrine requires that a
company with monopoly power over an essential facility, such as utility poles, must make that
facility available, notwithstanding a legitimate business reason for refusal. Id. See also supra note
62 for a thorough discussion of the essential facilities doctrine. A cable company trying to attach to
a utility company’s pole would most likely benefit from application of the four part test of the
essential facilities doctrine. Lloyd, supra note 7, at 255. First, utility companies can be natural
monopolies when they control the only poles in the area. Id. Second, duplication of the pole
infrastructure would be impracticable. Id. Third, denial of access to a facility because the company
seeking access is a competitor is not a legitimate business reason. Id. Fourth, it is not infeasible to
allow a competing service provider access to the utility company poles since such pole attachment is
already common. Id.
157. Just after the turn of the century, state regulatory bodies established regulated public
utility monopolies to deal with the problem of unnecessary investments in duplicating the essential
facilities, such as poles and wires. See Tim Rupp, The Effect of the Telecommunications Act of
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this would only further the problem of monopoly ownership, by in a
sense, creating two monopolies.158 When two different “players”
simultaneously control the same market, this is referred to as a duopoly,
and from an antitrust standpoint, it has similar regulatory concerns as a
traditional monopoly.159 The cable industry wanted to know if it was
entitled to regulated rates before making a large monetary investment in
duplicating the existing pole infrastructures.160
Now that cable
companies are comfortable with the Court’s decision, they will instead
spend that money entering into the utility and telephone companies’

1996 on the Local Exchange: A Significant Step in the Right Direction, 70 S. CAL. L REV. 1085,
1090 (1997) (reasoning that a duplication of each carrier’s infrastructure would result in inflated
costs for consumers and non-uniformity in the construction, operation, and maintenance of
telephone services). Duplication of facilities would also impede competition because many smaller
companies trying to enter the market do not have the economic resources to fund such a project. Id.
at 1099. Antitrust law is implicated if a monopolist, such as the utility companies in Gulf Power,
control the essential facility. Id. “[If] competitors are not reasonably and practically able to
duplicate that facility, the monopolist’s denial of the use of that facility by the competitor when it is
feasible to allow such use violates antitrust principles.” Id. Under the 1996 Act, the FCC for the
first time mandated cable companies’ access to the essential utility owned poles on a
nondiscriminatory basis. Overview, supra note 2, at 3-4. Utility companies can only deny access to
their poles for reasons of safety, reliability, and generally applicable engineering concerns. Id. at 4;
see also Thomas A. Piraino, Jr., The Antitrust Analysis of Network Joint Ventures, 47 HASTINGS L.
J. 5, 22-23 (1995) (noting that the large economies involved in telephone, utility, or cable networks
usually make it impractical for a competitive service provider to duplicate the necessary
infrastructure); Elena Maria Rodriguez, FCC v. Florida Power Corp.: Limiting the Utility of the
Loretto Rule, 41 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1149, 1149 (1987) (explaining that the cable industry’s use of
preexisting poles is the most feasible way of establishing their service due to financial, aesthetic and
franchise considerations).
158. See supra notes 139 - 141 and accompanying text for a discussion of monopoly
ownership.
159. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 519 (Bryan A. Garner ed., 7th ed., West 1999), defining a
duopoly as a market in which there are only two sellers of a product or service. Id. See also Jerome
A. Barron, Viacom-CBS Merger: Structural Regulation of the Media and the Diversity Rationale,
52 FED. COMM. L. J. 555, 555-57 (2000) (noting that duopolies are common in areas of FCC
jurisdiction such as radio and television stations). For example, the FCC permits common
ownership of two television stations in the same market if eight independently owned and operated
television stations remain in the same area. Id. at 555. There are three diversity rationales for
multiple ownership rules. Id. at 557. The first is to encourage gender, ethnic and racial diversity in
the ownership of broadcast radio or television stations. Id. The second is to maximize diversity of
viewpoint in programming. Id. The final rationale is that “media deconcentration rules will prevent
undue concentration of economic power contrary to the public interest.” Id.
160. Daniel F. Spulber, Deregulating Telecommunications, 12 YALE J. ON REG. 25, 53-54
(1995). Some theorists argue that an entrant into a market will pay higher costs to duplicate an
infrastructure than the incumbent paid to construct the original system. Id. at 53. If the costs of
attaching are too high due to lack of FCC regulation, then cable companies may find it economically
feasible to build their own duplicate facilities instead. Id. Cf. Rupp, supra note 157, at 1107
(discussing the options that CLECs have in the local telephone service market when LECs access
fees are left unregulated).
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markets.161
D. Where the Cable Companies Stand
Another economic benefit to cable companies that attach to existing
utility owned poles is that they will avoid the troubles of owning the
poles, such as franchise fees, rights-of-ways, and pole maintenance and
upkeep.162 Traditionally, municipal governments were authorized to
charge utility companies for the public space they used to house their
poles, in the forms of franchise and rights-of-way fees.163 In recent
years, the municipalities have relied on increasing these fees as an
additional source of government income.164 However, under Gulf
161. Esbin & Lutzker, supra note 128, at 410 (noting that computer, broadcast, cable,
telephone, satellite, and media entertainment industries will find themselves part of a much larger
marketplace). Esbin argues that these industries must learn to compete with each other in a broad
market, rather than remain sheltered from competition within their own narrow market segment. Id.
“[T]he convergence of telecommunications, computing and broadcasting industries as opening the
way for seamless access to multimedia information and entertainment any time, any place,
anywhere” is becoming commonplace in today’s society. Id. at 417.
162. Municipalities charge pole-owning utility and wireline telecommunications companies
fees, taxes, and rents for occupying municipal rights-of-ways. Leonard M. Baynes, How Much is the
Toll to Access the Information Superhighway? An Analysis of the Appropriate Measure of
Compensation for The Partial Taking of Public Utility Property, 62 TENN. L. REV. 141, 177 (1994)
(discussing that the most common computation for these charges is a franchise fee based on a
percentage of the companies’ gross revenues).
163. The municipalities’ authority to charge the utilities rent for poles is longstanding. See
Mackay Tel. & Cable Co. v. City of Little Rock, 250 U.S. 94 (1919) (holding that a $0.50 per pole
tax was reasonable); W. Union Tel. Co. v. City of Richmond, 224 U.S. 160 (1912) (finding that a
$2.00 per pole charge was reasonable); Atl. & Pac. Tel. Co. v. City of Philadelphia, 190 U.S. 160
(1903) (upholding a $1.00 per pole charge as prima facie reasonable); City of St. Louis v. W. Union
Tel. Co., 166 U.S. 388 (1897) (ruling that the lower court’s finding of reasonableness regarding a
$5.00 per pole fee was justified). In 1996, the Telecommunications Act codified the municipalities’
authority to charge for rights-of-way in § 253(c), which granted the municipalities new affirmative
rights to manage the rights-of-ways, and the authority to require payment of fees and compensation.
See Christopher R. Day, The Concrete Barrier at the End of the Information Superhighway: Why
Lack of Local Rights-of-Way Access is Killing Competitive Local Exchange Carriers, 54 FED.
COMM. L. J. 461, 469 (2002) (arguing that the municipal requirements and franchise proceedings
often make it more difficult for many new telecommunications providers to enter certain markets).
However, because the pole-owning companies are restricted to charging reasonable rates for
attachments, this may mean that companies that just attach, and do not own the poles, may be able
to offer the same services at lower prices. See id. at 463-64 (stating that an attaching company
“attempts to make a profit on the provision of this resold service by reselling it at a rate that is
generally equal to or lower than the rates charged by the incumbent carrier in the market”).
164. Day, supra note 163, at 469. See also Kent D. Wakeford, Municipal Cable Franchising:
An Unwarranted Intrusion into Competitive Markets, 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 233, 246-47 (1995)
(explaining that due to the monopoly nature of the cable industry, local municipalities demanded
higher franchise fees from cable companies, directly benefiting the local politicians in office and
transferring wealth from consumers to municipalities). Many municipalities required cable
companies seeking a franchise arrangement to “follow a rigorous application process delineating the
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Power, the utility companies are limited to charging “just and
reasonable” rates to competitors for renting space on their poles.165
Non-pole owning cable companies may have an economic advantage
over other types of service providers competing in the same information
technology market.166 Once a cable company attaches, it is free to
diversify its services; however, the rent the cable company pays for
attaching must still remain within the limitations set by § 224 of the
Act.167
E. Where the Pole Owning Utility Companies Stand
The gas and electric companies that own poles are now in a unique
position as well.168 Market competition theories do not come into play
features of the proposed cable system and all the additional services required by the city.” Id. at
247. The cable companies spent large amounts of money conforming to this process, reimbursed
the cities for administrative costs, and lobbied the politicians. Id. The municipalities put forth three
justifications for charging franchise fees: (1) the franchises’ essentially permanent use of public
ways; (2) the disruptive nature of constructing and maintaining a cable system and; (3) the inherent
characterization of the cable franchise as a natural monopoly. Id. at 249.
165. Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n, Inc. v. Gulf Power Co., 534 U.S. 327, 331-32 (2002).
See also Lawrence G. Acker, Rebecca L. Fowler & Elizabeth B. Dickerson, Effect of the
Telecommunications Act of 1996 on Access to Electric and Gas Utilities Rights-of-Way, 22 ENERGY
L. J. 361, 362 (2001) (stating that when Congress passed the 1996 Act, they made certain that pole
owning companies charging just and reasonable rates under § 224(b)(1) would recover the actual
costs of making their poles available to competitors, including a reasonable profit); Baynes, supra
note 162, at 148-49 (arguing that, pursuant to antitrust law, the just and reasonable rate is the proper
standard under which to determine the cost utility companies may charge competitors wanting to
attach to the utility company owned poles). An alternative rate methodology is the fair market
value, which is inappropriate for a monopoly company to charge because it would be difficult, if not
impossible, to determine. Id. at 149-50. “Applying the ‘just and reasonable’ rate standard in this
situation replicates the methodology, rationale, and result used in the regulation of other products
and services that a public utility provides.” Id. at 149; Gardner F. Gillespie, Rights-of-Way Redus:
Municipal Fees on Telecommunications Companies and Cable Operators, 107 DICK. L. REV. 209,
236 (2002) (stating that the term “fair and reasonable compensation” found in § 253 of the 1996
Act, which limits the ability of state and municipal governments to interfere with national regulation
of telecommunications, should be given the same meaning as the term “just and reasonable” rates
under the Pole Attachments Act).
166. See Chen, supra note 21, at 696 (opining that the Gulf Power decision may carry the
greatest weight in the issue of open access for cable broadband, because it is the first case related to
this debate that the Supreme Court decided). See also, Barbara Esbin, Internet Over Cable:
Defining the Future in Terms of the Past, 7 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 37, 88 (1999) (discussing that
in addition to providing traditional cable services, cable companies will also provide “enhanced
services” including “meter reading, stock market quotations, burglar and fire alarm services, athome shopping services, data service, and two-way television”). The FCC recognized the potential
importance of the cable industry in terms of the information services market when it amended the
1996 Act. Id.
167. Chen, supra note 21, at 696.
168. The 1996 Telecommunications Act substantially expanded the authority of the FCC over
local utility companies by establishing broad access to utility poles. See Acker, supra note 165, at
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unless these utility companies, for example, offer telecommunications or
cable services as well as electricity.169 The utility companies have less
competitive resistance,170 as these information service attachments just
serve as an extra source of revenue, and the burden of housing such
attachments is rather small.171 The pole-owning utilities may also serve
361 (explaining that the FCC concluded that the use of any utility pole for communications,
regardless of what type of utility company owned the pole, subjected the company to § 224 pole
attachment regulations). Section 224(a)(1) defines utility as “any person that is a local exchange
carrier or an electric, gas, water, steam or other public utility, and who owns or controls poles,
ducts, conduits, or rights-of-way used, in whole or in part for any wire communications.” 47 U.S.C.
§ 224(a)(1) (2000). In Gulf Power, the Supreme Court upheld the FCC’s interpretation that the Pole
Attachments Act also included regulation of attachments by cable companies providing Internet
services, and wireless telecommunications carriers. Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n, Inc. v. Gulf
Power Co., 534 U.S. 327, 335 (2002).
169. See Acker, supra note 165, at 378 (concluding that the utility companies are likely to give
preferential access to attaching companies that are affiliated with the utility). The Pole Attachments
Act does not provide the right to attach, as attaching agreements are entered into on a voluntary
basis. Overview, supra note 2, at 2. However, the Act does require that when agreements are
entered into, the rates charged by the utility company to the attaching company be “nondiscriminatory,” and “just and reasonable.” Id. at 2-3.
170. Richard E. Wiley, Competition, Consolidation, Convergence and Challenge:
Developments in Communications Law, in COMMUNICATIONS LAW 1999 at 79, 90 (PLI PATENTS,
COPYRIGHTS, TRADEMARKS, AND LITERARY PROPERTY, Course Handbook Series No. G0-0087,
Nov. 1999), available at WL 582 PLI/PAT 79. The framework of the 1996 Act was to eventually
permit local telephone companies and long distance carriers to enter into each other’s markets, as
well as provide other communications services. Id. Utility companies were seen to come into the
picture only in respect to the unique position of their poles in relation to attaching devices. Id.
Congress may not have properly anticipated that these myriad companies, including telephone,
utility, cable and Internet, would also be competing with each other as information service
providers. Id. An information service provider offers “a capability for generating, acquiring,
storing, transforming, processing, retrieving, utilizing, or making available information via
telecommunications, and includes electronic publishing.” 47 U.S.C. § 153(20) (2000).
171. Overview, supra note 2. The actual physical space occupied by a cable attachment is
approximately one inch. Id. at 2. Cable companies maintain their own lines, which are lashed to
steel strands that make them less likely to sag. Id. The clearance to the next communications user
is one foot. Id. However, the biggest burden to the utility company is not the physical space used,
but the limited supply of space available for the companies to rent. See Baynes, supra note 162, at
177 (explaining that pole attachment rates must be regulated because due to limited space, if a fair
market value is used to determine attachment rates, the cable companies would most likely be
charged a monopoly rent). Most utility company poles that house cable attachments are thirty-five
to forty feet high. Overview, supra note 2, at 2. Typically, these poles have six feet of their height
underground, and eighteen feet reserved for ground clearance. Id. This leaves approximately
eleven to sixteen feet of usable space. Id. For safety reasons, electric power lines are usually
located on the upper portion of the utility poles, and they require a forty-inch clearance from
communications cables on the same pole. Id. Telephone lines are typically strung at the minimum
ground clearance of eighteen feet. Id. Cable attachments are typically located one foot above the
telephone cables. Id. When the Gulf Power case reached the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh
Circuit, one claim brought forth by the pole owning utility companies was that the implementation
of the FCC’s formula for computing attachment rents amounted to a taking without just
compensation under the Fifth Amendment. Gulf Power Co. v. FCC, 208 F.3d 1263, 1271 (2000).
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as a “check” on how much money the pole owning telephone companies
can charge for attachments, by offering rental space for the same
attachments at a lower price.172 Telephone companies may be hesitant to
charge only the minimum rates provided for in § 224, because, in
essence, they are renting space to their direct competitors.173 However,
as noted before, it is not unforeseeable that traditional utility companies,
The court held that the attachments were a taking, but that because this was a facial challenge of the
FCC order in general, petitioners had to prove that the formula would deny just compensation in
every case, and this they did not do. Id. at 1272. The court stated that “the lowest rent that may be
considered just and reasonable is an amount equal to the incremental cost of adding the new
attachment to the utility’s pole; the highest rent that may be considered just and reasonable is an
amount equal to the fully allocated costs of the pole.” Id. The court held that the utility companies’
facial attack on the FCC order was not ripe for review, despite the fact that there could be
circumstances where the application of the FCC formula will deny just compensation. Id. at 1273.
The Supreme Court did not address the takings issue in their Gulf Power decision. See Gulf Power,
534 U.S. 327 (2002).
172. See Acker, supra note 165, at 378-79 (establishing a minimum and a maximum rate that
pole owning companies can charge, and still be within the “just and reasonable” boundaries set by §
224). See also Thomas A. Hart, Jr., The Evolution of Telco-Constructed Broadband Services for
CATV Operators, 34 CATH. U. L. REV. 697, 699 (1985) (stating that as the cable industry evolved,
cable companies turned to utility companies’ preexisting pole and conduit networks, as an
alternative to telephone companies’ poles, as a means of attaching their cables); Mark Sievers, And
Now For Something Completely Different, 4 KAN. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 109 (1995) (discussing that a
new entry into the telecommunications market, such as a power company or a cable television
company, may be able to provide local telephone service at lower costs, so that the incumbent
telephone company would be forced to reduce its costs to match its new competitor). Cf., Athur
Bresnahan, The (Unconstitutional) Telco-Cable Cross-Ownership Ban: It Seemed Like a Good Idea
at the Time, 1 MICH. TELECOMM. TECH. L. REV. 79, 82 (1996) (explaining that the 1984 Cable
Communications Policy Act expressed similar concerns in a related area when it banned a telephone
company’s provision of all video programming over its own facilities). Congress and the FCC
feared that telephone companies would begin to provide cable service at a lower rate than
independent cable operators because they had an artificial cost advantage by owning the necessary
poles. Id. The courts have since struck down this cross-ownership ban as being unconstitutional.
See, e.g., Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co. v. United States, 830 F. Supp. 909 (E.D. Va. 1993);
BellSouth Corp. v. United States, 868 F. Supp. 1335 (N.D. Ala. 1994); Ameritech Corp. v. United
States, 867 F. Supp. 721 (N.D. Ill. 1994); US West, Inc. v. United States, 855 F. Supp. 1184 (W.D.
Wash. 1994).
173. Acker, supra note 165, at 378-79. Compare William P. Rogerson, New Economic
Perspectives on Telecommunications Regulation: Competition in Telecommunications: JeanJacques Laffont and Jean Tirole, MIT, 2000. Pp xvii, 315, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 1489, 1499-1500
(2000) (explaining that the “optimal price cap” theory of government regulation of
telecommunications industry charges is used to ensure that an incumbent telephone company will
have no artificial incentive to attempt to degrade access to its competitors). The optimal price cap
theory is based on an absolute or global pricing structure that regulates all the services a company
offers, rather than regulating the margin between the access price and the specific services, such as
long distance service, local telephone service, cable service and Internet service. Id. at 1499. But
see Lloyd, supra note 7, at 254 (noting that federal regulation aids in assuring that monopoly
companies do not engage in predatory pricing, which is illegal under § 2 of the Sherman Act).
Predatory pricing occurs when a company reduces prices below cost in order to force competitors
out of the market. Id.
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such as a local electric company, may enter the information
superhighway and start providing high-speed Internet access.174
V. CONCLUSION
In the not too distant future it will be almost impossible for
consumers to tell the difference between a cable company, a
telecommunications company and an Internet service provider. A single
provider will offer all three types of services, and possibly more, in a
digital format over primarily fiber optic broadband plant.175 It seems
futile then for Congress to attempt to individually categorize these
merging technologies, just for the purpose of establishing federal agency
authority to regulate.176 Statutes such as § 224(b)(1), which allow broad
regulation as long as the regulation is “just and reasonable,” are the best
way to deal with emerging technologies that defy definition at every
174. See supra note 161 and accompanying text (discussing converging technologies). See
also Steve Bickerstaff, Shackles on the Giant: How the Federal Government Created Microsoft,
Personal Computers, and the Internet, 78 TEX. L. REV. 1, 2-3 (explaining that companies that either
did not exist, or were relatively unknown, twenty years ago have become the source of very
substantial wealth for their founders and stockholders, due to the explosive growth of the Internet).
In addition to adding to our economy, the increased use of the Internet has “altered in a virtually
unprecedented fashion the way in which many Americans conduct their businesses, run their
households, raise their children, search for or obtain information, conduct their political campaigns,
and entertain themselves. Possibly the greatest effect has been and will increasingly be on how and
what people communicate.” Id. at 3. See also Steven C. Carlson, A Historical, Economic, and
Legal Analysis of Municipal Ownership of the Information Highway, 25 RUTGERS COMPUTER &
TECH. L. J. 1, 4 (1999) (suggesting that publicly owned utilities offer the lowest possible Internet
access rates, and therefore are the best providers of Internet services).
175. Esbin, supra note 166, at 118 (explaining that in just using a cable line there are three
potential ways to deliver a single, world-wide web page to a subscriber). These three ways are (1)
through the cable system over a cable modem, (2) via a broadcaster’s digital signal carried as a
channel of television programming over cable systems, and (3) on a dial up basis from a cable
operator’s competitive local exchange carrier. Id. This does not include other Internet access
options such as, traditional dial up through a wire-based telephone line, high-speed telephone access
via DSL, and remote wireless Ethernet systems. See Joseph Kattan, Broadband and Mandatory
Access, in E-COMMERCE ANTITRUST & TRADE PRACTICES: PRACTICAL STRATEGIES FOR DOING
BUSINESS ON THE WEB at 269, 271-73 (PLI CORPORATE LAW AND PRACTICE, Course Handbook
Series No. B0-0116, Mar. 2001), available at WL 1236 PLI/CORP 269 (analyzing the pros and cons
of the competition between broadband Internet access and traditional dial-up Internet access). See
also Kenneth N. Gilpin, Cable Industry Plays Catch-Up, N.Y. TIMES, May 19, 2002, at section 3,
page 7 (stating that the cable industry must start marketing its Internet services to stay at the
forefront technologically).
176. See Esbin & Lutzker, supra note 128, at 73 (noting that the FCC recognizes its own
“widespread confusion regarding the regulatory status of Internet services provided over cable”).
The need to establish a national policy of information services regulation is evident in the
“Pandora’s Box” of regulatory consequences regarding the pole attachment, open access and local
exchange carrier monopoly debates. Id. This national policy can be accomplished through broad
regulation, rather than taking a divide and conquer approach. Id.
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turn.177 The Chevron analysis supports this view by directing the courts
to defer to an agency’s interpretation of its own statutes, even when the
statute itself may be ambiguous.178
The purpose behind the 1996 Telecommunications Act is to prevent
monopolies and to encourage the development of, and public access to,
information technology and services.179 FCC rate regulation is an
essential means to effectuate this end, and now under Gulf Power, the
rate restraints apply to any type of provider wishing to attach to poles
and enter the information technology market.180 It is both too
cumbersome and too speculative for Congress to predict and categorize
what type of companies will want to attach what type of devices in the
future.181
The FCC has the authority to regulate interstate
telecommunications.182 With the convergence of present technology, this
means that even local, or traditionally intrastate, telephone companies
are joining the global communications market, thus falling within the

177. See supra notes 111 - 122 and accompanying text for a discussion of broad regulation of
information services.
178. See supra note 45 and accompanying text for a thorough analysis of the Chevron
doctrine.
179. See supra notes 21 - 22 and accompanying text for a discussion of the purpose behind the
1996 Telecommunications Act.
180. Morrissey, supra note 101, at 167 (explaining that before the Pole Attachments Act of
1978, the cable industry lacked the bargaining power necessary to prevent arbitrary pole attachment
rates by utility pole owners). In addition to being subject to unregulated rates, the cable industry
also lacked a forum for review. Id. Thus, the Pole Attachments Act was put into place, with a
comprehensive plan to address the problems at the time. Id. See also 31 FED. PROC., L. ED.
§72:364 (May 2002) (explaining that the FCC has the right to hear claims over rates charged to
cable television systems for pole attachments that support equipment used to provide non-video
services in addition to traditional cable services, as well as claims concerning pole attachments
which are used to provide solely intra-state, non-video cable services). Today’s problems
concerning the cable industry, and the information service industries in general focus on high
technology definitions that Congress was not contemplating in 1978. See supra notes 111 - 122 and
accompanying text for an explanation. However, the goal behind the Pole Attachments Act should
still be the same; to provide uniform regulation and prevent monopolies, regardless of what
categorical business the attaching companies are in. See supra notes 111 - 122.
181. As Oscar Wilde so aptly put it in 1894, “[t]here is a fatality about all good resolutions.
They are invariably made too soon.” OSCAR WILDE, THE COMPLETE OSCAR WILDE: PHRASES AND
PHILOSOPHIES FOR THE USE OF THE YOUNG 855 (Quality Paperback Book Club, 1996).
182. 47 U.S.C. § 151 (2000), which states that the FCC was created
[f]or the purpose of regulating interstate and foreign commerce in communication by
wire and radio so as to make available, so far as possible, to all the people of the United
States, without discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, national origin, or sex,
a rapid, efficient, Nation-wide, and world-wide, wire and radio communication service
with adequate facilities at reasonable charges.
Id.
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FCC’s jurisdiction.183 The FCC should equally regulate all companies
that want to become players in the “universal service”184 market, and
effectively break up the local monopolies that own existing
infrastructures, regardless of what category the service providing
company falls within.185 Although the immediate issue in Gulf Power is
a small, obscure, one-inch technology attachment that sits high in the air
atop a pole, the implications of this decision may position the FCC to
continue even-handed regulation of the converging information
technology industries. After all, what’s in a name?
Darci Deltorto186

183. See supra notes 123 - 144 and accompanying text for a discussion of the local exchange
carrier monopoly, and suggestions for FCC regulation. See also Jonathan Galst, “Phony” Intent?:
An Examination of Regulatory Preemption Jurisprudence, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 108, 109 (1992)
(explaining that [even before the 1996 Act] the FCC took a procompetitive stance toward
preempting state regulations that attempt to “restrict entry and slow new investment by the phone
companies and their competitors”).
184. See Mark P. Trinchero & Holly Rachel Smith, Federal Preemption of State Universal
Service Regulations Under the Telecommunications Act, 51 FED. COMM. L.J. 303, 305 (1999)
(defining the notion of universal services as extending telecommunications services “to as many
members of society as possible” while providing the necessary funding to support this policy).
185. Brief of Petitioner at 12, Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n, Inc. v. Gulf Power Co., 534
U.S. 327 (2002) (No. 00-832) (stating that Congress’ intent to encourage the development of
broadband access and to promote the continued development of the Internet is consistent with a
broad regulatory regime). This supports the notion that cable television systems can provide
commingled Internet access without suffering a financial penalty from the pole owning companies’
unreasonable attachment rates. Id. Without broad regulation, “cable television systems are in effect
penalized as soon as they invest in providing broadband Internet access as well as cable television
service to their subscribers.” Id.
186. I would like to thank Professor Jay Dratler, Jr. for his thoughtful insight and guidance in
helping me piece together this article.
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